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ABSTRACT
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have been utilized for many applications such
as tracking and monitoring of endangered species in a national park, soldiers in a bat-
tlefield, and many others, which require anonymity of the origin, known as the Source
Location Privacy (SLP). The aim of SLP is to prevent unauthorized observers from
tracing the source of a real event (an asset) by analyzing the traffic of the network. We
develop the following six techniques to provide anonymity: Dummy Uniform Distri-
bution (DUD), Dummy Adaptive Distribution (DAD), Controlled Dummy Adaptive
Distribution (CAD), Exponential Dummy Adaptive Distribution (EDAD), Exponen-
tial Dummy Adaptive Distribution Plus One (EDADP1 ), and Exponential Dummy
Adaptive Distribution Plus Two (EDADP2 ). Moreover, an enhanced version of the
well-known FitProbRate technique is also developed. The purpose of these techniques
is to overcome the anonymity problem against a global adversary model that has the
capability of analyzing and monitoring the entire network.
We perform an extensive verification of the proposed techniques via simulation,
statistical, and visualization approaches. Three analytical models are developed to
verify the performance of our techniques: A Visualization model is performed on
the simulation data to confirm anonymity. A Neural Network model is developed
to ensure that the introduced techniques preserve SLP. In addition, a Steganography
model based on statistical empirical data is implemented to validate the anonymity of
the proposed techniques. The Simulation demonstrates that the proposed techniques
provide a reasonable delay, delivery ratio, and overhead of the real event’s packets
while keeping a high level of anonymity.
Results show that the improved version of FitProbRate massively reduces the
number of operations needed to detect the distribution type of a data sequence de-
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spite the number of intervals when compared to the original. A comprehensive com-
parison between EDADP1, EDADP2, and FitProbRate in terms of the average delay,
anonymity level, average processing time, Anderson-Darling test, and polluted sce-
narios is conducted. Results show that all three techniques have a similar performance
regarding the average delay and Anderson-Darling test. However, the proposed tech-
niques outperform FitProbRate in terms of anonymity level, average processing time,
and polluted scenarios. WSN applications that need privacy can select the suitable
proposed technique based on the required level of anonymity with respect to delay,
delivery ratio, and overhead.
v
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research Problem and Scope
WSNs consist of homogeneous, small, and low-cost sensor nodes [1, 2] that have
limitations in resources such as processing power, memory [3–7] and battery life [8,9].
Since WSNs have limited resources [10,11], a sensor node should only compute basic
operations [3]. Usually, sensors are used to sense information such as temperature,
humidity, and light [12–15]. Sensor nodes notify the sink through intermediate sensor
nodes that act as forwarders to pass the data to its final destination [16]. WSNs
can also be used for monitoring and tracking applications such as monitoring and
tracking endangered species in a national park, patients in a hospital, or soldiers in
a battlefield [17–23]. In WSNs, communication between nodes consumes more power
than the processing and computation inside the sensor node itself [3, 24]. WSNs can
be deployed in remote locations [25] that are unreachable by wired networks such as
a hostile environment [26, 27] or a vast forest [28]. Thus, security of sensor networks
is critical, and it should be addressed very carefully [29–31].
Security in WSNs are classified into content threats [32–34] and context threats
[35–38]. Content security focuses on protecting the content of packets by providing
confidentiality, authentication, integrity [39], and many other encryption techniques
[40–42], whereas context security such as SLP focuses on concealing the location of
the source node [30, 43–45]. The anonymity of a node means that this node should
be untraceable under any statistical analyses applied by an adversary [29, 46]. The
main objective of SLP is to keep the originator node untraceable and unlinkable.
Untraceability means that the adversary is unable to trace back the source node
[29, 47], whereas unlinkability means that the adversary cannot gain the identity of
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the origin [29]. In SLP, the real event (an asset) has three parameters: event type,
event time, and event location [30]. These parameters are continually targeted by
the adversary to gain information about them (Figure 1.1). Even after employing the
most sophisticated encryption techniques, context security requires more convoluted
techniques to secure the location of the source as the adversary attempts to locate
the source by eavesdropping on the network traffic. Sink Location Privacy is another
context security concern [48]. It prevents adversaries from gaining information about
the sink location. The anonymity of the sink node is an entirely different problem.
The focus of this work is only on SLP.
Figure 1.1. Real event parameters.
Adversaries can employ two types of attacks: active and passive [49,50]. An active
attack occurs when the adversary attempts to alter the network traffic by modifying
the packets’ header, the packets’ content, or even by injecting new packets into the
network to apply some attacks such as Denial-of-Service (DoS ). In contrast, a passive
attack occurs when an adversary analyzes the network traffic without alteration by
observing which sensor nodes are transmitting and which sensor nodes are not. A pas-
sive attack is more difficult to detect than an active attack because no modifications
are noticed by the system. This work attempts to defend against passive attacks.
Two types of adversaries exist: local and global. A local adversary has a partial
view of the network, limited resources, and is only able to analyze local traffic. The
local adversary can be countered by modifying the existing routing protocols [51]. In
2
contrast, a global adversary has a full view of the network, unlimited power, sufficient
resources, and can analyze the entire traffic of the network [52]. A global adversary
can apply sophisticated analyses such as Rate Monitoring and Time Correlation at-
tacks [52–54]. Global adversaries require more sophisticated methods to be countered.
This work only considers the global adversary as the attacking model.
In WSNs, tracking devices are often attached to assets, e.g., a Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) tag. A RFID can either employ active or passive tags. The
active tag has a battery and is able to send signals to the sensor nodes, which can be
utilized to simulate the movement of an asset at different locations within the net-
work, whereas the passive tag does not have a battery and cannot send signals [55].
This work only considers passive tags because they are cheaper and more applicable
when the WSNs is out of reach.
A variety of schemes exist to overcome context threats against a global adversary
such as Separate Path Routing (SPR), Network Location Anonymization, Network
Coding, and Dummy Data Sources (DDS ) [4]. SPR creates multiple paths from a
source to the sink, which means each packet of an event uses a different route to the
destination [56]. Network Location Anonymization hides the identity of the source
by using pseudonyms [57, 58]. Network Coding divides a packet into smaller pieces.
These pieces will follow different routes to the sink [59, 60]. DDS [61] creates fake
sources, which generate dummy traffic to hide and obfuscate the real traffic inside.
DDS is by far the most effective method against global adversaries because the use of
fake sources and dummy traffic confuses the adversary about the identity and location
of the source [52,62]. DDS approach will be used in the proposed techniques because
it provides higher anonymity than other methods.
There are three types of packets: real, fake, and corrupted. Real packets carry
information related to the real event such as its location. Fake packets do not carry
3
any information about the real event. They are often utilized to mislead and confuse
the adversary about the actual location of the real event [4]. Corrupted packets are
further classified into two types: injected and modified. The injected packets mean
that new packets are inserted into the network by an adversary to apply, e.g., DoS.
The modified packets mean that the existing packets are altered by an adversary [63].
Since the utilized global adversary model is passive, this work only considers real and
fake packets. Figure 1.2 shows the different types of packets.
Figure 1.2. Types of packets.
The fundamental idea behind the proposed techniques is as follows: When a real
event (an asset) is detected, it should be reported to the sink. Therefore, hiding the
real event is mandatory, the network should be injected with dummy traffic using the
lowest transmission rate as possible to confuse the adversary. This low transmission
rate is needed to minimize the communication overhead. The dummy traffic is injected
into the network in a probabilistic manner that leads to time and location privacy of
the source node. In this work, the anonymity of an asset means hiding the existence
of the asset at a certain time located nearby a sensor node, which subsequently leads
to SLP.
This work is about optimizing source anonymity of WSNs with acceptable delay,
delivery ratio, and overhead against a global adversary model that is capable of
employing sophisticated traffic analyses. A WSN application that needs privacy
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should be able to select one of the proposed techniques that fits its required level of
anonymity with respect to delay, delivery ratio, and overhead.
1.2 Motivation behind the Research
The detection of significant events such as the location of endangered species
in a national park or soldiers in a battlefield needs to be securely communicated to
the sink. Protecting assets from being discovered or even captured is essential. In
order to protect these assets, the defensive team (the system) must make the offensive
team (the adversary) confused about the existence of the real event. Therefore, the
defensive team must inject the network with dummy traffic to prevent the adversary
from tracing back the origin by analyzing the network traffic. Traffic analysis can be
Rate Monitoring, Time Correlation, or Size/Structure Correlation.
1.3 Contributions of the Proposed Research
We developed several techniques that outperform existing approaches in provid-
ing source anonymity against a global adversary model. Most of the current tech-
niques compare their work only to the previous ones. However, in this work, we
provided a validation of the proposed techniques by developing analytical models to
confirm the high anonymity of our techniques.
• Six different techniques: DUD, DAD, CAD, EDAD, EDADP1, and EDADP2
are developed to provide source anonymity with acceptable delay, delivery ratio, and
overhead.
• The proposed techniques can protect multiple real packets concurrently, unlike
many of the previous techniques that can only protect one real packet at a time.
• Different analytical models are developed: Visualization, Neural Network, and
Steganography to confirm the validation of the proposed techniques.
5
• An enhanced version of the FitProbRate technique is developed that reduces
the number of operations by applying the Anderson-Darling test (A-D) on the last
ten elements of the sequence instead of the entire sequence as implemented in the
original FitProbRate technique.
• A comprehensive comparison between EDADP1, EDADP2, and FitProbRate
is conducted to confirm the high performance of the proposed techniques. The fol-
lowing metrics are used in the comparison: average delay, anonymity level, average
processing time, A-D test, and polluted scenarios.
• A novel software architecture for a specialized network simulator is developed,
and targeted towards analysis and verification of anonymity algorithms.
1.4 Research Hypothesis
The global adversary is confused about the existence of the real event (an asset)
when the WSN is injected with dummy traffic due to the large amount of noise
introduced by the proposed techniques. In this work, Null (H0) means that the
adversary is confused about the existence of the real event. Alternative (H1) means
that the adversary is not confused about the existence of the real event.
The rest of the work is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the background.
Chapter 3 describes the literature. Chapter 4 discusses system models and proposed
techniques. Chapter 5 shows the implementation and test plan. Chapter 6 presents
the results.
6
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
A sensor node consists of four components: sensing, processing, communication,
and power subsystems [64]. The sensing subsystem senses the desired phenomena
such as temperature and feeds the detected analog signal to an Analog-to-Digital-
Converter (ADC ) to prepare it for further processing. The processing subsystem is
the core component of the sensor node architecture, and consists of a processor and
memory. This subsystem is responsible for computation and making the data ready
for transmission. The communication subsystem has a radio, and in some cases, its
own processor to transmit, forward, or receive the data from/to neighboring nodes.
Finally, the power subsystem generates DC power to provide the electric current to
the other subsystems. All of these subsystems work together creating a functional
sensor node that is able to interact with the environment and other nodes within its
sensing range to achieve a particular task [3].
Security in WSNs has been a challenge because of the unique aspects they have.
It is unsatisfactory to use the ordinary security mechanisms in WSNs due to the limi-
tation of resources such as processing power and battery life. Sensors are independent
and do not normally follow a central control entity because of their large scale and
frequent topology changes. Therefore, traditional security solutions are inapplicable
since they require significant overhead and sufficient memory. One of the basic de-
fenses against security attacks is the ability to access network nodes physically. This
is impractical in WSNs as many applications require sensor nodes to be deployed in
remote and open locations that are difficult to reach, control, manage and protect
from unauthorized physical accesses. Packets in WSNs are vulnerable to be lost or
corrupted for several reasons such as routing failures or collisions. These challenges
must be taken into consideration when developing a security technique for WSNs [3].
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There are several kinds of attacks that can be a threat to the WSNs security
such as DoS, routing attacks, transport layer attacks, data aggregation attacks, and
privacy attacks, which are all shown in Figure 2.1. DoS occurs when an adversary
prevents the network from functioning or providing the expected services to applica-
tions. DoS has two types of layer attacks: physical layer and link layer. One of the
attacks on the physical layer is the Jamming attack; it interferes with radio frequen-
cies of the sensor nodes preventing them from transmitting and receiving meaningful
data. Tampering attack is also a physical layer attack that attempts to destroy or
modify a sensor node physically. This attack might lead the adversary to obtain sen-
sitive information that could lead to compromising the entire network. A Collision
attack is a link layer attack that interferes with packet transmissions to make the
network re-transmit the same packets repeatedly, which increases the overhead and
power consumption [3].
A variety of routing attacks can be performed by an adversary. For example, a
malicious node in the Blackhole attack and Sinkhole attack tries to convince the net-
work that it is the data forwarder of many routes in the network. Once the malicious
node receives the packets, this node drops them right away. Another attack is the
Selective Forwarding attack, which is very similar to the Blackhole attack and Sink-
hole attack. The only difference is that Selective Forwarding attack discards a certain
number of packets based on specific criteria rather than dropping all incoming pack-
ets. Some other attacks target the on-demand routing protocols such as the Rushing
attack. In this attack, the malicious node forwards all incoming route requests to
nearby nodes without using the actual routing protocol policies, which involves more
nodes in the route. Location-based routing protocols are weak against the Sybil at-
tack that provides the adversary with multiple identities at different locations in the
network. Legitimate nodes will think that the malicious node is one of its trusted
neighboring nodes and start forwarding packets to the malicious node. Wormhole is
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another attack on routing. The Wormhole attack occurs when the malicious node has
more capabilities such as bandwidth than other nodes in the network. This increase
in capabilities might attract authorized nodes to forward their data to the unautho-
rized node since it has a high-speed connection. The Wormhole attack could help
other attacks such as Blackhole to take place [3].
Transport layer protocols such as Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User
Datagram Protocol (UDP) are vulnerable to the Flooding attack. A protocol such
as TCP keeps state information allowing the adversary to send multiple connection
requests that waste memory and reject any future connection requests even from au-
thorized nodes. The Desynchronization attack attempts to block the transmission
between two nodes by sending fake messages using a modified sequence number to
both parties making each node believe that its packet has not been delivered. There-
fore, a re-transmission is needed causing unnecessary overhead [3].
Data aggregation works by combining duplicated data from multiple sensor nodes
to reduce the overhead and redundant information. There are many aggregation func-
tions such as Sum, Average, Count, Max, and Min that can be easily modified by the
adversary to make the network act differently [3].
Privacy attacks focus on analyzing the traffic of the network [35–38]. An adver-
sary can obtain critical information by snooping on the network. The nature of WSNs
facilitates attackers to monitor and capture the traffic between sensor nodes. Traffic
analysis allows the adversary to identify the most important nodes in the network
such as source and sink nodes or gain information about the hot-spot and high traffic
regions in the network, known as the Rate Monitoring attack. Time Correlation is
another privacy attack that monitors the difference between transmitting times of
packets and if the network packets follow a specific distribution type in trying to find
the relationship, e.g., transmitting times between real and fake packets. This could
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lead to exposing the location of the source node. Another attack is the Size/Structure
Correlation [65], which focuses on the size and payload structure of packets to ob-
serve any differences. This work focuses on providing techniques that prevent privacy
attacks against source nodes.
Figure 2.1. Types of attacks in WSNs.
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE SURVEY
In this chapter, the existing techniques in the literature that rely on fake packet
injections against a global adversary are presented. Additionally, two classifications
of these techniques are conducted: The first classification categorizes the techniques
based on the utilized characteristics. The second classification categorizes the tech-
niques based on their assumptions for the global adversary.
3.1 Fake Packet Techniques
3.1.1 Periodic Collection (PeCo)
PeCo [66] is one of the first techniques that introduced the concept of fake packets
against global adversaries. This technique works as follows: Each node in the network
must obtain a shared individual key between itself and its neighboring nodes for
encryption purposes. When the sensor node receives a packet, it decrypts and adds
the packet to its buffer using the First-In-First-Out (FIFO) queuing mechanism.
Every node has a timer that counts down; once the timer reaches zero, the first real
packet in the buffer is encrypted and sent to the destination. However, if there is no
real packet, a fake packet is generated and sent instead. On the receiving side, if a
node received a fake packet, it discards the packet instantly. The main issue in PeCo
is the buffer size. The network nodes should have a sufficient buffer size to manage
all incoming packets. Overhead, power consumption and latency are also considered
as serious issues in PeCo because the nodes generate a fake packet whenever there is
no real packet to transmit.
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3.1.2 Constant Rate (ConstRate)
The fundamental concept of ConstRate [54] is to divide the lifetime of the network
into intervals. Packets are only sent or forwarded at these intervals whether they are
real or fake to make them indistinguishable. If a node does not have a real packet
to transmit during the interval, a fake packet is transmitted instead. However, the
use of intervals concept increases the latency. In addition, this technique has a high
power consumption due to the number of fake packets created to cover the real traffic.
3.1.3 Probabilistic Rate (ProbRate)
The difference between ProbRate [54] and ConstRate is that ProbRate selects
the next interval to send or forward packets based on the exponential distribution
to reduce the delay and number of fake packets. However, if the adversary knows µ,
which is one over the transmission rate, and it is the only parameter in the exponential
distribution, the network might be compromised. Therefore, the random number that
is used to generate µ needs to be protected and unknown to adversaries.
3.1.4 Fitted Probabilistic Rate (FitProbRate)
FitProbRate [54] uses the same exponential distribution as ProbRate to generate
dummy traffic. If a node detected a real event, it transmits real packets following the
exact exponential distribution of the fake packets. Therefore, the adversary would be
unable to distinguish the difference between real and fake packets. In order to reduce
the traffic overhead, the transmission rate should be as low as possible; in return, this
small transmission rate increases the delay relatively.
The network nodes generate a random number utilizing a unique seed to pre-
dict the following sending time interval. The seed can be known to the adversary,
whereas the random number must be hidden. When a real event occurs, FitProbRate
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must use the same µ of the fake packets exponential distribution to avoid any Time
Correlation attacks by the adversary. Concurrently, packets of the real event should
be transmitted as soon as possible. Therefore, FitProbRate employs the A-D test
to determine whether a series of intervals follow the exponential distribution or not.
This is achieved by searching the first appropriate time interval that satisfies the A-D
test, which at the same time does not break the exponential distribution sequence for
the real packets. In case there is a scheduled fake interval, it is replaced by the real
one. The fake interval will be rescheduled for later, as shown in Figure 3.1. Interval
D is the fake one and it will be replaced by interval C, which has the real packet.
Then, the fake packet in interval D will be rescheduled for transmission in interval E.
The disadvantages of this technique are as follows: First, it has significant traffic
overhead that reduces the lifetime of the network. Second, using the A-D test every
time a real event is detected increases power consumption and processing time. Lastly,
transmission rate and delay cannot be controlled since FitProbRate does not provide
a mechanism to ensure the maximum required delay by intolerant applications.
Figure 3.1. An example of the FitProbRate technique.
3.1.5 Baseline
In the Baseline [67] technique, each node in the sensor network transmits real or
fake messages pursuing a constant or exponential distribution. When a node detects
a real event, it does not transmit the message immediately. Instead, the node waits
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for a while to ensure that the real packet follows the same distribution as the fake
packets. As a result, the adversary cannot recognize the difference between real and
fake events. However, this technique is very expensive for the network because it adds
a massive amount of traffic overhead and decreases the delivery ratio of real packets
since Baseline uses intervals to deliver the real event.
3.1.6 Proxy-based Filtering (PFS)
To overcome the issues of the Baseline technique such as high overhead and poor
delivery ratio, PFS [67] was introduced. The primary concept of PFS is to hire
some of the sensor nodes to act as designated proxies. These proxies filter the fake
packets towards the sink, which reduces the overhead traffic while keeping the source
anonymity.
In PFS, some of the sensor nodes are selected to filter the fake packets from
neighboring nodes, as shown in Figure 3.2, which reduces the overhead as many of
the fake packets are dropped before reaching the sink. A proxy node filters the packets
to decide which packets will be forwarded and which packets will be dropped. PFS
Figure 3.2. The filtration mechanism in PFS.
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relies on the location of the proxy nodes; therefore, a proxy placement algorithm is
performed to minimize the overhead of the network. Further, PFS should select the
values of the proxies’ buffer’s parameters correctly such as size. This selection is nec-
essary to handle the transmission delay of the real event at the source node. Authors
of [67] claim that the PFS technique provides a nearly optimal proxy placement, high
delivery ratio, and low bandwidth overhead.
The PFS technique divides the network into cells that allow every two nodes
in neighboring cells to communicate directly with each other. When an event is de-
tected, it belongs to the cell, not to the node. Each cell has a coordinator node that is
responsible for all actions within the cell. A unique ID is assigned to each cell in the
network. A node recognizes its cell by using a GPS or an attack-resilient localization
scheme. The sink is assumed to be in the center of the network, and each event has
a cell ID, event type, and event time.
After proxies have been selected, they broadcast a “hello message” that includes
Time-To-Live (TTL) that has the ability to reach all cells in the network. Next,
each cell records the nearest proxy based on the received “hello message” and assigns
the selected proxy as the default one for future communications. Then, every cell
responds back to the selected proxy to inform the proxy that it is the one selected
by the cell. Each cell creates a pairwise key with its proxy using one of the keying
schemes. In addition, each proxy has a shared key with the sink. When a cell has a
message to transmit, this message is encrypted using the pairwise key and sent after
encryption to the proxy using a multi-hop routing protocol such as Greedy Perimeter
Stateless Routing (GPSR). However, these messages follow the exponential distri-
bution whether they are real or fake to avoid any Time Correlation attacks by an
adversary. Therefore, if a cell observed a real event, the real event is delayed until
the cell finds the appropriate time interval that does not violate the exponential dis-
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tribution. When a proxy receives a fake packet, it discards the packet immediately.
However, if the received packet is a real packet, the proxy re-encrypts the packet us-
ing the key shared between itself and the sink. Then, the proxy forwards the packet
after delaying it in its buffer for an appropriate time. In case the proxy node did not
receive a real packet for some time, it transmits a fake packet to the sink instead.
Note that a proxy node is able to recognize the difference between real and fake
packets. Moreover, if a proxy receives a packet from another proxy in the network
whether the packet is real or fake, the proxy forwards the packet to the next hop
without filtration. A message routes through multiple proxies on its way to the sink;
however, it is only being filtered in the original proxy. Eventually, optimizing the
proxies location is essential to avoid undesirable traffic overhead. A disadvantage of
this technique is that the sink must be in the center of the network. Another dis-
advantage is the filtration delay as the packet has to be filtered by a proxy before
arriving at the sink.
3.1.7 Tree-based Filtering (TFS)
TFS [67] is an improved version of PFS. The difference between them is that
TFS has several layers of filtration, the proxies nearest the sink filter fake packets
coming from the proxies that are far from the sink, which leads to less overhead. In
TFS each proxy has a parent proxy, and can have some child proxies using a tree
concept to decrease the number of fake messages towards the sink. In contrast, more
delay is required because the message is delayed in each and every proxy towards the
sink. Therefore, the relationship can be described as a trade-off between overhead and
delay while keeping high anonymity. Nevertheless, assuming the sink node is in the
center of the network will limit the applications that can implement this technique.
Using multiple proxies for filtration might also impact the performance of TFS.
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3.1.8 Optimal-cluster-based Source Anonymity Protocol
(OSAP)
Techniques like ConstRate and FitProbRate provide source anonymity but they
are costly since they inject the network with a large number of fake messages. Further,
all nodes in the network transmit traffic towards the sink that causes the network to
be imbalanced as nodes nearest the sink consume more power than nodes far from
the sink, which leads to a shorter lifetime of the network.
To overcome the high overhead in ConstRate and FitProbRate, and latency in
PFS and TFS, OSAP [68] was developed. OSAP is based on FitProbRate and the
authors of [68] argue that the use of unequally clustering mechanism will reduce the
traffic overhead, improve the network balance, and decrease the latency of the real
event. The unequally clustering mechanism is achieved by adjusting the transmission
rate and the radius of unequal clusters. As a result, this mechanism fixes the overhead
issue by transforming the issue into a mathematical programming problem that is
solved by mathematical methods.
If a node has a real event to report, it becomes a source that generates some
real packets, unlike FitProbRate, which allows all nodes to transmit packets whether
they are real or fake. In addition, authors of OSAP assume that the sink is placed
in the center of the network and works as the data collector for all events. Each
packet has a source ID, event description, event time, and packet type (real or fake).
Each node determines the number of hops to the sink by using the following formula:
(2n− 1)pir2θ where n is the number of hops, r is the transmission range and θ is the
network density of nodes distribution. After a node knows its hops count to the sink,
the sensor network is divided into uneven clusters. Clusters, which are close to the
center of the network are larger than the ones that have a further distance from the
center, as shown in Figure 3.3. The sink node has the largest cluster and nodes at
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edges of the network have the smallest clusters. Nodes are categorized into cluster
heads and cluster members. The purpose of the cluster head is to filter the incoming
fake packets, and forward the real packets of the cluster members to the sink. The
cluster head of the cluster with radius R1 is the sink and all nodes within this cluster
transmit their packets directly to the sink. All nodes with distance R2, R3, ...,Rn
are cluster head candidates that have cluster radius of R2 − R1, R3 − 2R2 + R1,
..., Rn − Rn−1 − randin−1, respectively. After cluster head nodes are selected, they
broadcast BEACON packets with TTL, which includes the radius of the clusters they
belong to. Member nodes select their cluster head based on the least communication
cost, which is decided by the received BEACON packets. Then, each member node
notifies its selected cluster head by a BEACON response. Therefore, the network will
consist of rings and each ring consists of clusters. The distance between cluster head
nodes and the sink is R2, R3, ...,Rn.
Figure 3.3. Overview of the unequally clustering mechanism in OSAP.
This technique assumes that each member node shares a pairwise key with its
cluster head using a keying scheme. Each cluster head shares a key with its neighbor-
ing cluster head nodes. Once the member node detects an event, it sends the event
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to its cluster head using a multi-hop routing protocol. The member node delays the
real packet to the next interval. Therefore, the adversary cannot distinguish the real
packets from the fake ones using time analysis. Then, the cluster head decrypts the
message and forwards it to the next cluster head encrypted by the shared key between
them. In order to satisfy source anonymity, the transmitting time intervals follow the
exponential distribution as exhibited by the FitProbRate technique. When a fake
packet is received by the head cluster, it is discarded. In contrast, if the cluster head
received a real packet, it re-encrypts and forwards the packet towards the sink after
an appropriate time that follows the exponential distribution. However, if there is
no real packet, the cluster head sends an encrypted fake packet instead. In case a
cluster head received a packet from another cluster head, it forwards the packet after
an appropriate time whether it is real or fake without filtration. The total delay of
the real event must be less than the maximum required delay by the application. In
addition, it is obvious that member nodes at the edge of the network have more clus-
ter heads on the path to the sink, which increases the delay. Therefore, selecting the
appropriate µ for each cluster is mandatory to balance the latency between clusters
and to avoid any time analysis attacks from the adversary. Finally, balancing the
power consumption between clusters is made by adjusting the radius of the unequal
clusters and transmission rate.
OSAP still has some limitations; it assumes that the sink location is in the center
of the network. This assumption is impractical for many applications that require
the sink to be at different locations in the network. Another limitation is that the
communications within the network are based on the same cluster heads that do not
change during the lifetime of the network. Using the same cluster heads every time
decreases the lifetime of the network because the cluster heads will consume more
power than cluster members causing the network to be imbalanced regarding power
consumption.
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3.1.9 Recurrent Clustering Mechanism (RCM)
The reason current techniques have failed is that the nodes nearest the sink
consume more power than the nodes far from the sink, RCM [69] authors argued.
In order to balance the network, a clustering technique was introduced. All nodes
use the FIFO queuing mechanism. Each cluster has a cluster head that coordinates
the activities within the cluster. Each node has a timer, once the timer is equal to
zero, the sensor node checks if it has a real packet in its buffer to transmit. In case
there is no real packet, a fake packet is sent instead to the sink. Remaining energy
of cluster heads is computed every time there is a packet to transmit. The higher
cluster head in terms of the remaining energy is selected to forward the packet. In
this technique, the sink location is known to the adversary. Since this technique uses
clustering and selects the highest cluster node with remaining energy, RCM improves
the power consumption by half compared to other techniques, the authors of [69]
argued. Moreover, RCM reduces the overhead because of the clustering mechanism.
However, the authors of [69] did not mention how they control the delay and delivery
ratio. Overhead is still a concern because every time the node does not have a real
packet, it generates a fake packet instead, which might lead to traffic overhead.
3.1.10 General Fake Source (GFS)
The GFS [55] technique attempts to simulate the movement of a real asset at
different locations in the network to mislead the adversary about the actual location of
the source node, as shown in Figure 3.4. This mechanism can be implemented easily
if the RFID type is active. However, the goal of GFS is to simulate the movement
of the asset using a passive RFID. GFS generates dummy traffic of a fake source. A
shared token is used to determine which node should act as a fake source. Then, the
fake source generates a fake event just after detecting the real asset. Next, the token is
passed between nodes to simulate the movement of the real asset. In order to simulate
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a real asset, the number of intervals, which is represented by simulateRound that a
fake source will transmit should vary from node to node, to mislead the adversary.
Another variable is the realCount ; it is increased by one whenever a node sends a real
message. Once a node stops sending real messages, the realCount is reset to one, and
simulateRound is updated.
Figure 3.4. Overview of the real asset simulation in GFS.
The fake source is selected randomly and generates fake messages until simulateR-
ound becomes zero; then the token is passed. However, to avoid passing the token
between only two nodes, the last fake source is recorded in the preNode variable.
When the fake source has a real message, the sink should be informed and the token
is passed to the next node. Further, if there are real or fake messages without a token,
the message can be passed normally to the sink. However, if the fake message has a
token, the receiving node will get the preNode and tokenID. Then, the receiving node
becomes the new fake source.
Since the token creates extra traffic that might be noticed by the adversary, each
fake source needs to send a fake report to make the token message look like an ordi-
nary real report. Eventually, real and fake messages have to be transmitted together
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in every interval to distract the adversary. However, GFS has some drawbacks: First,
it assumes that the sink is placed in the center of the network. Second, if the token is
passed among three nodes or more rather than between two nodes, there is no mech-
anism to handle this kind of situations. Third, GFS could fail to provide anonymity
because only fake messages are created when a real event takes place. Therefore, the
adversary might detect that a real event is being sent resulting in exposing the loca-
tion and time of the event in case the adversary has enough capabilities and resources
to examine all nodes at once.
3.1.11 Naive Algorithm (NAA)
Each node in NAA [70] broadcasts a fake message periodically. The time duration
of these periods should be long enough to avoid draining the nodes’ battery very
quickly. If a node has a real message to transmit, it waits until the upcoming fake
message is ready. However, instead of transmitting the fake packet, it is replaced
by the real message. Once the real message is received by intermediate nodes, the
process is repeated until the real message reaches its destination. The adversary
cannot distinguish the difference between real and fake messages since they are sent
using the same transmission rate. Nevertheless, the delay in this technique is high
because it uses fixed long periods to transmit real messages.
3.1.12 Globally Optimal Algorithm (GOA)
The GOA [70] technique is an upgraded version of NAA. It was developed to
decrease the delay of the real event. GOA provides each node with a timer that is
defined by a pseudo-random number generator. This timer is utilized to allow the node
to transmit real packets. If the time count reaches zero, and there is no real packet to
transmit, a fake packet is transmitted instead. All nodes must use the same pseudo-
random number generator and obtain the seed used by other nodes. This concept
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allows GOA to decide the shortest path to the sink. The GOA technique improves
the throughput and power consumption when compared to ConstRate. However, the
primary issue in GOA is that it should have knowledge about the entire topology of
the network, which is not required by ConstRate.
3.1.13 Heuristic Greedy Algorithm (HGA)
The HGA [70] technique is very similar to GOA, but HGA only needs to obtain
the seed and location of neighboring nodes allowing each node to select the best
neighboring node to send or forward the packet.
3.1.14 Probabilistic Algorithm (PBA)
The PBA [70] technique is developed to reduce the overhead of dummy traffic in
GOA and HGA. It fo1lows the same process as HGA. However, nodes do not have to
transmit a fake packet every time the time count reaches zero in case there is no real
packet to transmit. PBA uses a probability p to decide whether the node should send
a fake packet or not; p is considered as a threshold, and used to trade-off between
anonymity and overhead.
3.1.15 Distribution Resource Allocation Algorithm (DRAA)
The DRAA [71] technique uses the same concept as ConstRate. Each node in
DRAA measures the best transmission rate for dummy traffic to reduce the overhead
of the network. The main purpose of DRAA is to hide the real traffic within minimal
dummy traffic. This mechanism can be achieved without applying the entire process of
the original ConstRate technique. The DRAA technique provides SLP with reduced
power consumption when compared to ConstRate according to DRAA developers.
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3.1.16 Optimal Filtering Scheme (OFS)
The OFS [72] technique is based on TFS and PFS techniques. Each node in
OFS has the possibility to become a proxy. This method can provide an optimal
routing and filtering that eventually leads to optimal lifetime for the network. Once
a sensor node is selected to be a proxy, it can use its filtration rules for further
optimization to maximize the network lifetime. Moreover, a proxy has the ability to
filter packets coming from other proxies, unlike TFS, where the proxy transmits all
incoming packets from other proxies without any filtrations. In this protocol, proxies
have two options: First, proxies can work individually, which increases the delay and
provides a high level of anonymity. Second, they work together to decrease the delay
with a low level of anonymity. This technique is considered as a trade-off between
delay and anonymity. The challenge in OFS is to select the best locations for the
proxies.
3.1.17 Aggregation-based Source Location Protection Scheme
(ASLP)
The ASLP [73] technique uses similar filtration techniques as OFS. ASLP has
three phases: fake packets, packet encryption, and data aggregation. In ASLP, the
WSN is divided into clusters, and each cluster has a cluster head. Cluster heads follow
a tree structure scheme to reach the sink. Every cluster member shares a key with
its cluster head to encrypt the traffic between them. In addition, nodes communicate
with their cluster head using the exponential distribution to reduce the delay and
overhead. The exponential distribution is only controlled by one parameter λ, which
is the transmission rate. Cluster nodes report the event to their cluster head, which
also can be the sink node periodically; this period is decided by the value of τ . In
the second phase, values of λ and τ are distributed throughout the network by the
sink. In the third phase, the actual data aggregation and reporting take place. A
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node transmits a real packet whenever it detects a real event to the sink using the
exponential distribution. Otherwise, the node transmits a fake packet instead. The
cluster heads receive the packet from cluster members and forward it to the sink using
an encrypted channel. Values of λ and τ are utilized in this technique to trade-off
between latency and power consumption. This trade-off can be adjusted according
to the requirements of the applications.
3.1.18 Trusted Computing Enabled Heterogeneous (TCH-WSN)
The network in TCH-WSN [74] is also divided into clusters. Each cluster contains
a high-performance node with two modules: Trusted Platform Module (TMP) and
Mobile Trusted Module (MTM ). These two modules are used to provide data security
and integrity. The sink and cluster heads are assumed to have continuous power
supply. The sink communicates with all nodes directly. However, a sensor node
communicates with the sink only through its cluster head. The cluster head assigns
one of the nodes in its cluster to act as a fake source for a specific duration of time.
Then, the fake source transmits dummy traffic to the sink.
3.1.19 Efficient Privacy Preservation (TESP)
The TESP [75] technique uses cluster heads to filter fake packets that are being
transmitted to the sink. TESP consists of three phases: The first phase, the sink
provides public and private keys to each node in the network. The keying mechanism
contributed by the sink is based on elliptic curve cryptography, which is preferred over
the traditional asymmetric key algorithms. In the second phase, nodes are deployed,
organized, and assigned to clusters. All clusters have a cluster head that connects to
all other cluster heads as well as to the sink in a tree structure manner. The sink is
placed at the root of the tree. Neighboring nodes have a symmetric key between them
to communicate securely. In the final phase, each sensor node checks its buffer for
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real packets. If there is no real packet, the node generates a fake packet encrypted by
the public key of the cluster head. However, if the node has a real packet in its buffer,
this packet is encrypted by the sink’s public key. When a packet reaches the cluster
head, if the cluster head is able to decrypt the packet successfully, that means it is a
fake packet. Therefore, the packet is dropped immediately. Each cluster head collects
all packets from its cluster members. Then, the cluster head waits for a higher cluster
head or the sink to ignite the data collection signal. Once the cluster head receives
the signal, it sends the collected data after re-encryption to the higher cluster head
or the sink. In case the higher cluster head received the data from a lower cluster
head, it adds its collected data to the incoming data. This process is repeated until
all collected data reaches the sink.
3.1.20 Cloud-Based Scheme for Protecting Source-Location
Privacy (CSPSLP)
In CSPSLP [43], the authors assume that multiple sensor nodes detect the asset,
and these nodes attempt to inform the sink about the location of the asset simul-
taneously, which creates a traffic hot-spot. Normally, the adversary seeks hot-spot
areas to discover the source node. The main aim of CSPSLP is to hide the actual
source inside a cloud that consists of multiple nodes. Therefore, the real hot-spot is
hidden within a larger cloud. CSPSLP consists of three stages: In the first stage, each
node is assigned a unique ID, a secret pairwise key with its neighboring nodes, and a
shared key with the sink. These ID and keys are used by nodes to build pseudonyms
that are very similar to the hidden identities utilized in Anonymous Path Routing
APR [76, 77].
The second stage is executed at the deployment of the nodes, and it is called the
bootstrapping stage. In this stage, each node sends its location to the sink to obtain
the shortest path between itself and the sink. The following step is to select some of
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the nodes randomly that are at most h hops away from the sensor node itself. These
selected nodes become fake sources, and they exchange data with each other to create
pseudonyms among them. Each node separates its neighboring nodes into different
groups. All created groups are placed in opposite directions from each other. Further,
every node shares a secret key with each group.
The third stage is the event transmission. When a source detects a real event, it
decides which node will act as a fake source. Furthermore, the source node broadcasts
the packet to one of its groups that was already created. However, the chosen group
must have one member on the path towards the selected fake source. The transmit-
ted message contains the actual event encrypted by the pairwise shared key between
the source and the sink. Moreover, the pseudonym is shared among the real and
fake sources as well as among intermediate nodes, fake sources, real sources, and fake
sinks. An intermediate node adds the packet to its buffer only when its pseudonym
is in the packet. Otherwise, the intermediate node generates a fake packet with a
TLL counter. This packet is forwarded until the TLL counter reaches zero. When
the pseudonym of a node is in the packet, the node moves the pseudonym to the next
intermediate node and forwards the packet to the group that the node belongs to.
All members of the group receive the packet; if the member’s pseudonym is not in
the packet, the member generates a fake packet. Nevertheless, if the packet has the
pseudonym of the member, the member node adds the packet to its buffer and repeats
the process until the packet reaches the fake source. Once the fake source receives
the packet, it forwards the packet to the sink using the same process as APR. How-
ever, CSPSLP has only one difference from the original APR; CSPSLP re-encrypts
the packet that has the event information between all intermediate nodes using the
shared key between itself and the sink. When the sink receives the packet, it searches
for the pseudonym of the source and the fake source to select the appropriate key to
decrypt the packet. Finally, dummy traffic that belongs to the same cloud is filtered
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by the intermediate nodes. For example, if one of the intermediate nodes had many
fake packets from the same cloud, the intermediate node has the right to use a filtra-
tion mechanism. This filtration is utilized to only forward one of the fake packets to
reduce overhead.
3.1.21 Dummy Wake-up Scheme (DWUS)
The key concept of DWUS [78] is to create multiple dummy traffic streams to
direct the adversary away from the actual location of the source node. These streams
have to be toward the sink. DWUS coordinates the dummy traffic streams to act
similar to real traffic streams. This technique consists of three phases: First, the WSN
is divided into different groups of dummy populations. Each group has a group leader
that is changed periodically. This group leader is responsible for selecting the fake
sources. The second phase is called the Wake-up, each group leader hires a nearby
fake source and sends a wake-up message to the selected fake source. In the third
phase, once the fake source receives the wake-up message, it sends a fake message
towards the sink using one of the selected intermediate nodes. Phase two and three
are repeated using a fixed transmission rate to simulate the existence of the real asset
at different locations, which subsequently confuses the adversary about the original
location of the real asset.
3.1.22 Group Algorithm for Fake-traffic Generation (GAFG)
The fundamental notion of GAFG [79] is very similar to DWUS. Every node in
the network transmits its packets to the sink following a predefined path. Forwarding
nodes have a higher transmission rate than source nodes. Once a source detects a
real event, GAFG transmits the event to the sink using the exponential distribution.
Then, GAFG attempts to create fake data reports that have a very close µ to the
real data report. Moreover, this technique ensures that many nodes in the WSN will
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transmit fake data at specific times according to the real event exponential distribu-
tion. Nevertheless, GAFG is vulnerable to Rate Monitoring attacks since forwarding
nodes have higher transmission rates than source nodes.
3.1.23 Source Simulation (SoSi)
This technique [80] assumes that the global adversary can only trace the presence
of a moving asset. The adversary tracks every trace in the network whether it is real
or fake. Moreover, each trace is assumed to be a candidate of a real trace. The
main aim is to create several traces to mislead the adversary about the presence of
the real event. Additionally, SoSi has its own definition for privacy. Privacy occurs
when the adversary observes a set of transmissions, which indicates that the asset
is nearby one of the nodes. Virtual assets are created to copy the behavior of the
real asset to confuse the adversary. Another purpose of these virtual assets is to
create dummy traces. In order to implement the virtual assets, some sensor nodes
are selected randomly. Each selected node obtains a token in the deployment stage.
These nodes are called the token nodes. SoSi forces the WSN to function in rounds;
each round has a fixed time. In each round, a fake event is transmitted to the sink by
the token node through its neighboring nodes, which create a stream of traffic. By
the end of each round, the token node selects the next node that will act as a token
node. The SoSi technique does not increase the delay since the dummy streams do
not affect the real event. However, the use of dummy streams increases overhead.
3.1.24 Source and Destination Seclusion using Clouds
(SECLOUD)
The SECLOUD [81] technique has three steps: First step, each node transmits
a “hello message” to all nodes in the network using flooding routing protocol. The
“hello message” includes a TTL counter in trying to find the nearby nodes within a
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specific range h. These nodes create a cloud; if a node of a cloud desires to transmit,
it selects some of the cloud members to act as pseudo-sources. The basic idea of
pseudo-sources is to generate fake packets using the same transmission rate as the
real source. All fake packets will be dropped by the receivers. The sink has its
cloud and uses the same procedure of ordinary nodes. In the second step, SECLOUD
provides the source node with multiple options. The first option is to communicate
with the sink using single path routing algorithm. The other option is to use delegate
sources and delegate sinks. In the second option, the source node assigns some of
its cloud members to be delegate sources, and the sink assigns some of its cloud
members to be delegate sinks. Therefore, packets can travel between the source and
sink through delegate nodes. In the last step, the fake sources and fake sinks that
are created in the first step can be utilized to transmit dummy traffic between them.
This step is essential to hide the real traffic, which confuses adversaries about the
location of the real event. However, the utilized mechanism to create fake clouds is
not explained in details. Moreover, the use of the cloud concept might increase the
power consumption and overhead of the system.
3.1.25 Unobservable Handoff Trajectory (UHT)
The UHT [82] technique has a unique assumption about the adversary. This
assumption is that the asset can enter and move to a random point within the network.
Nodes have information about the poisson distribution of assets entering the WSN.
The traveled distance by assets is based on the uniform distribution. In addition,
all nodes use the same shared key to encrypt and decrypt messages among them.
In this solution, the edge nodes are called the perimeter nodes because they are the
first nodes to detect the asset in the network. The perimeter nodes transmit fake
messages in case there are no real events detected by them. A fake message should
have a length variable that behaves similarly to TTL. The next step is to XOR the
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fake message with the ID of the next node that will send the fake message. The fake
message is routed to the sink through intermediate nodes. All nodes use a broadcast
technique to transmit their messages. Once a node receives a message, it attempts to
XOR the message with its ID to determine whether the node should generate a fake
message or not. If a readable message is the output of the XOR operation, the length
variable is decreased. In case the length variable is not zero, the node sends a fake
message after XORing it with the next node ID. In contrast, if the length variable
is zero, the message is XOR-ed with the current node ID. Then, the node transmits
the fake message to the sink through intermediate nodes. By sending messages from
fake events, the adversary becomes completely confused about the candidate event
and whether it is real or fake.
3.1.26 Pollution Avoiding Source Location Privacy (PA-SLP)
In this technique [63], messages are transmitted in specific time slots to avoid
Time Correlation attacks. In addition, PA-SLP implements random network coding
on the transmitted packets to prevent Size/Structure Correlation attacks. In PA-SLP,
there are three different types of packets: real, fake, and polluted (packets created or
modified by an adversary). Therefore, a mechanism called Triple-Type Homomorphic
Signature (TTHS ) was developed to filter the unwanted packets such as the fake and
polluted ones. Moreover, a signature equation with a secret key is used to determine
the type of the forwarded packets without exposing their contents. If the packet type
is real, it will be forwarded to the next node towards its destination. However, if the
packet is fake, it will be discarded to reduce the overhead of the network. Lastly,
in case the packet is polluted, it will be utilized to improve the Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS ) by locating the captured nodes. The entire process is employed by
intermediate nodes to enhance the overall performance of the network.
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3.2 Classification of Fake Packet Techniques
This section provides a classification of fake packet techniques regarding the
use of: Intervals, Timers, Random Numbers, Probability, Clusters, Proxies, Constant
Distribution, Exponential Distribution, and Poisson Distribution. The classification
is presented in Table 3.1. Intervals indicate that the lifetime of the network is di-
vided into time durations. These durations can be equal or unequal based on the
implemented distribution. Timers are utilized as a trigger for a node to transmit
either real or fake packets. Random Numbers decide the probability of a node to
transmit a packet. Probability decides whether a node will transmit a packet or not.
Clusters indicate that the network is divided into groups of nodes (Figure 3.5). Each
group has multiple member nodes and one head node. Proxies are commonly used to
filter fake packets towards the sink. Constant Distribution breaks down the time into
equal intervals, whereas Exponential Distribution decides the next interval according
to this equation: X = log (1−u)−λ , where X is the next interval, u is the uniform random
number, and λ is the transmission rate. Poisson Distribution calculates its intervals
Figure 3.5. The clustering mechanism. H is a cluster head. M is a cluster member. S is the sink.
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distribution based on the following equation: P (x, λ) = λ
xe−λ
x!
, where P (x, λ) is the
probability, x takes a whole number, and λ is the average number of events per inter-
val. All techniques are assumed to implement similar structure, format and size for
both real and fake packets. Using different size or format for fake packets makes real
packets easily detectable if an adversary applies a Size/Structure Correlation analysis.
Table 3.1. Classification of fake packet techniques.
Technique Intervals Timers Random Numbers Probability Clusters Proxies Distribution Type
PeCo [66] • • - - - - -
ConstRate [54] • - - - - - Uniform
ProbRate [54] • - - - - - Exponential
FitProbRate [54] • - • • - - Exponential
Baseline [67] • - - • - - Uniform
Exponential
PFS [67] • - - - • • Exponential
TFS [67] • - - - • • Exponential
OSAP [68] - - - - • - Exponential
RCM [69] - • - - • - -
GFS [55] • • - - • - -
NAA [70] • - - - - - -
GOA [70] • • • - - - -
HGA [70] • • • - - - -
PBA [70] • • • • - - -
DRAA [71] • - - • • - Uniform
OFS [72] • - - - - • -
ASLP [73] • - • - • • Exponential
TCH-WSN [74] - - - - • - -
TESP [75] - - - - • • -
CSPSLP [43] - - - - • - -
DWUS [78] • - - - • - Uniform
GAFG [79] • - - • • -
Uniform
Exponential
Poisson
SoSi [80] • - - - - - -
SECLOUD [81] - - - - • - -
UHT [82] • - - - - - Poisson
PA-SLP [63] • - - • - • Uniform
• Used.
- Not used.
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3.3 Global Adversary Models
This section provides a detailed description of the used global adversary models
in fake packet techniques, and how assumptions are made in each one of them.
The PeCo technique assumes that the adversary is able to deploy its own sensor
network to monitor and analyze a WSN. Furthermore, the adversary network con-
sists of a smaller number of nodes than the targeted network as the adversary only
eavesdrops on the radio signals of legitimate nodes. Additionally, the adversary does
not sense the environment like the authorized nodes. The adversary is also equipped
with GPS to detect the location of communications precisely [66].
The adversary is considered as external, global and passive in ConstRat, ProbRate
and FitProbRate techniques. External means that the adversary cannot control or
compromise a sensor node physically. Global means that the adversary has a full
view of network communications as well as sufficient resources and unlimited power.
Passive has three different aspects: First, an attacker cannot expose the content of a
real event message that could lead to the source ID. Second, in the situation where
messages are encrypted the same way during the forwarding process, the attacker has
the capability to trace back the origin. Third, the adversary can apply complicated
traffic analyses such as Rate Monitoring and Time Correlation. In Rate Monitoring
attacks, the adversary focuses on the difference of the transmission rates between
nodes, especially those nodes with higher rates. Nevertheless, the Time Correlation
attack works on the diversity of transmission times between transmitting packets. It
is also assumed that the adversary has enough resources to apply all of these advanced
attacks [54].
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Baseline, PFS, TFS and OSAP techniques have the same assumptions for the
adversary, which is external, global, and passive [67]. However, OSAP provides more
assumptions: First, the adversary knows the location of all nodes in the network.
Second, it knows the distribution type of the WSN. Third, the adversary has the ca-
pability to compare its time interval observations with the known distribution type.
Additionally, the adversary is assumed to be unable to disclose the content of packets
or identify whether the packet type is real or fake [68].
In RCM, the adversary cannot decrypt communications of the network. There-
fore, packets appear completely random from the adversary perspective. Moreover,
the adversary is aware of the sink location [69].
The GFS technique builds its own technique based on the following adversary
model assumptions. The adversary deploys its network to overhear the radio trans-
missions among legitimate nodes. Adversary nodes have unlimited processing power
and battery life. The adversary can only eavesdrop on the traffic, but it is unable to
alter the traffic or compromise the sensor nodes. Data is encrypted and the adversary
cannot gain any meaningful information about the packets’ content. Further, real and
fake packets are identical in size and structure making the adversary unable to dis-
tinguish the difference between them. Lastly, the adversary has knowledge about the
sink location, the network topology, and the implemented routing protocol [55].
NAA, GOA, HGA and PBA techniques utilize a similar adversary model. This
model assumes that the attacker knows the location of all sensor nodes in the targeted
network. Moreover, the attacker has the ability to snoop on the traffic of the entire
network. The adversary has enough resources to keep all collected data for further
oﬄine analyses. However, the attacker is unable to break the encrypted packets or
compromise sensor nodes physically [70].
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DRAA, OFS, ASLP and TESP techniques assume the popular external, global
and passive adversary model [71–73, 75]. However, the adversary in TCH-WSN can
monitor the entire network traffic [74].
The CSPSLP adversary model deploys its monitoring devices in the targeted ar-
eas within the network. The adversary collects information from multiple areas, but
not from the entire network. These areas are called the observation points, and their
location is adjustable to be as close as possible to the real asset. This model has three
different characteristics: passive, well-equipped, and informed. Passive means that
the adversary does not modify the network transmissions; it only observes transmis-
sions among nodes. Well-equipped means that each attacking device can measure the
angle of arrival and strength of the signal to determine the source location. However,
the adversary is unable to spot the receiving nodes because all nodes within the range
of the transmitting node will receive the signal. Lastly, the adversary is informed; it
knows the sink location and is able to monitor the sink node traffic as well [43].
DWUS assumes that the adversary is passive and has unlimited resources. Fur-
ther, the adversary can distribute attackers throughout the network to sense all trans-
mitted packets [78].
In the GAFG technique, the adversary is aware of the sink location and network
topology. The adversary is passive and can detect the time and location of all trans-
missions. Moreover, it has the ability to perform sophisticated statistical methods for
detection. However, the adversary cannot break the encryption of packets [79].
The adversary model in SoSi [80] is considered to be fast and effective. It has
two possibilities: First, the adversary uses a large number of devices to monitor the
entire network. Second, the adversary can deploy a smaller number of devices that
have more capabilities and resources. However, authors of [80] argue that the second
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option is impractical because of the high cost. They also assume that the adversary
can sense the actual asset instead of overhearing the traffic among authorized nodes.
In this technique, the adversary uses GPS or one of the localization techniques to
determine roughly the occurrence area of the real event.
In SECLOUD, the adversary capabilities are a combination of different adver-
sary models presented in [66, 83, 84]. In this model, the attacker knows the network
topology and retains the measurements of the entire network traffic including Rate
Monitoring and Time Correlation. In addition, the attacker has the ability to visual-
ize the network traffic and regulate the network links density. However, the adversary
is passive and cannot compromise network nodes. The attacker has its own network
that consists of several malicious nodes. These nodes collaborate together using a
different frequency band to transmit the collected data to a centralized malicious en-
tity [78].
The UHT technique follows the external, global, and passive adversary model.
However, UHT has further assumptions. In cases where the adversary knows the
location of the sink, it will snoop on all communications within the network. The ad-
versary can attack communications among intermediate nodes in a parallel manner.
After collecting data, the adversary checks the content of packets to gain informa-
tion about the source ID. However, in a situation where packets are well-encrypted,
there are two possibilities: First, if packets remain the same without re-encryption
when they are forwarded, the adversary can trace them back to the origin. Second, if
packets are decrypted and encrypted every time before forwarding, the adversary will
apply complex analysis methods such as Rate Monitoring and Time Correlation [82].
The PA-SLP adversary model is assumed to be both external and internal. More-
over, it can perform active and passive attacks. The adversary has the ability to
eavesdrop on the entire network. In addition, it can apply Time Correlation and
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Size/Structure Correlation attacks. The adversary might capture intermediate nodes
and disclose the secret keys. Exposed keys are utilized to pollute the traffic by in-
serting new packets into the network or altering the existing packets [63].
3.4 Classification of Global Adversary Models
This section provides a classification of the used global adversary models (Ta-
bles 3.2 and 3.3) in the discussed fake packet techniques regarding the usage and
knowledge of the following assumptions: Topology Information, Sink Location, Lo-
calization, Interval Distribution, Rate Monitoring, Time Correlation, Visualization,
Machine Learning, and Statistical Methods. Topology Information means that the ad-
versary knows the location of all nodes in the network and how they are connected to
each other. Sink Location means that the adversary is able to determine the location
of the sink node. Localization means that the adversary can use GPS or one of the
localization techniques. Interval Distribution means that the adversary knows the
distribution type of packets. Rate Monitoring means that the adversary can differen-
tiate between transmission rates of network nodes. If a node has a higher transmission
rate than other nodes, this node is easily detectable, e.g., the 0.4 transmission rate
some nodes use in Figure 3.6.
Time Correlation means that the adversary can distinguish the difference of
transmission times between packets. For instance, in Figure 3.7, interval G does not
seem that it follows the same distribution of the other intervals. Therefore, if network
nodes transmit packets using uniform distribution, and one of these nodes decided
to transmit packets without using the uniform distribution, the adversary can easily
differentiate between these packets. Visualization means that the adversary has the
ability to convert the sending/not-sending behavior of the network nodes into a bi-
nary image. This image can be analyzed to gain meaningful information about the
real event. Machine Learning means that the adversary can employ a classifier such
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as the neural network to analyze the traffic of the WSN. Finally, Statistical Methods
mean that the adversary is able to perform a sophisticated statistical analysis.
Figure 3.6. Rate monitoring. Solid circles are nodes with transmission rate of 0.2 per second.
Dashed circles are nodes with transmission rate of 0.4 per second.
Figure 3.7. An example of time correlation.
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Table 3.2. Classification of global adversary models (1).
Technique Topology Information Sink Location Localization Interval Distribution Rate Monitoring
PeCo [66] not known not known used not known not used
ConstRate [54] not known not known not used known used
ProbRate [54] not known not known not used known used
FitProbRate [54] not known not known not used known used
Baseline [67] not known not known not used not known used
PFS [67] not known not known not used not known used
TFS [67] not known not known not used not known used
OSAP [68] known not known not used known used
RCM [69] not known known not used not known not used
GFS [55]
known
(including the used
routing algorithm)
known not used known used
NAA [70] known known not used not known used
GOA [70] known known not used not known used
HGA [70] known known not used not known used
PBA [70] known known not used not known used
DRAA [71] not known not known not used known used
OFS [72] not known not known not used not known used
ASLP [73] not known not known not used known used
TCH-WSN [74] known not known not used not known not used
TESP [75] not known not known not used not known used
CSPSLP [43]
known
(location of sending
nodes only)
known used not known used
DWUS [78] not known known not used known not used
GAFG [79] known known used known not used
SoSi [80]
not known
(routing algorithm
is known)
not known used known used
SECLOUD [81] known not known not used not known used
UHT [82] not known known not used known used
PA-SLP [63] not known not known not used not known used
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Table 3.3. Classification of global adversary models (2).
Technique Time Correlation Visualization Machine Learning Statistical Methods
PeCo [66] not used not used not used not used
ConstRate [54] used not used not used used
ProbRate [54] used not used not used used
FitProbRate [54] used not used not used used
Baseline [67] used not used not used not used
PFS [67] used not used not used not used
TFS [67] used not used not used not used
OSAP [68] used not used not used not used
RCM [69] not used not used not used not used
GFS [55] used not used not used not used
NAA [70] used not used not used not used
GOA [70] used not used not used not used
HGA [70] used not used not used not used
PBA [70] used not used not used not used
DRAA [71] used not used not used not used
OFS [72] used not used not used not used
ASLP [73] used not used not used not used
TCH-WSN [74] not used not used not used not used
TESP [39] used not used not used not used
CSPSLP [43] not used not used not used not used
DWUS [78] not used not used not used not used
GAFG [79] used not used not used used
SoSi [80] not used not used not used not used
SECLOUD [81] used used not used not used
UHT [82] used not used not used not used
PA-SLP [63] used not used not used used
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CHAPTER 4: SYSTEM MODELS AND
PROPOSED TECHNIQUES
4.1 System Models of the Proposed Techniques
In this section, we present the network model, routing model, adversary model,
anonymity model, and Anderson-Darling model of the proposed techniques.
4.1.1 The Network Model
A number of sensor nodes are distributed in the area of interest. Distribution of
nodes can be random or in fixed locations. All sensors have the same resources such
as memory, processing power, and battery life. A sensor node collects information
about the asset within its sensing area, and transmits this information to the sink
that has more resources than ordinary sensor nodes. The sink node can be placed at
any location in the network such as at one side of the network or in the center of the
network. Sensing area for each node can be calculated as follows:
Rarea = pir
2 (4.1)
Where Rarea is the transmission area and r is the transmission range. In the case
of forwarding packets from one node to another, all nodes satisfy Equation (4.2) are
considered as neighboring nodes of the transmitting node.
(xn − xsource)2 + (yn − ysource)2 < r2 (4.2)
Where xsource and ysource are coordinates of the source node. xn and yn are co-
ordinates of the receiving node. Sensor nodes can locate their position by using one
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of the localization techniques in the deployment stage. There are many localization
techniques in the literature [3, 85–87] used by WSNs to provide each node in the
network with its current location as well as neighboring nodes’ locations. Many of
the localization techniques provided in the literature can work just fine as an addi-
tive module to our framework. Each application has its specific requirements such
as the lifetime of the network and the maximum delay. The lifetime of the WSN
is divided into time intervals. Each interval can further include many sub-intervals.
This mechanism can be adjusted to meet the application requirements. All real and
fake packets are assumed to be encrypted using a shared key between senders and
receivers. Therefore, the message payload is secure. Real and fake packets are iden-
tical in terms of size and structure to avoid Size/Structure Correlation attacks by an
adversary. When a receiving node receives a packet, it is able to differentiate between
real and fake packets by decrypting them using the shared key.
4.1.2 The Routing Model
The routing protocol, in our proposed model, is based on the location of sensor
nodes. It is also called geographical routing [88]. Therefore, each node should know
its coordinates and its neighboring nodes’ coordinates as well. The routing protocol
selects the next node on the path towards the sink based on the following equation:
d =
√
(xc − xsink)2 + (yc − ysink)2 (4.3)
Where xsink and ysink are the coordinates of the sink, xc and yc are the coordinates
of the candidate node, and d is the destination between the sink and candidate node.
The node with the smallest d value will be the next hop on the path. The developed
location-based routing protocol is flexible. This flexibility means that if the selected
candidate node is out of battery or has physical damage, the routing protocol will
choose the second best candidate node that satisfies the minimum d. The entire
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process will be repeated until the packet is received by the sink. This routing protocol
does not cause high power consumption. It is employed to reduce the total number
of packets throughout the network, which leads to less overhead. Flooding-based
routing is not utilized in this work because it surges the number of overhead packets
and causes high power consumption.
4.1.3 The Adversary Model
In this work, the employed global adversary is passive, external, and global that
is similar to the model proposed in [54,68]. Passive adversary means that the observer
can analyze and collect packets. An external adversary cannot compromise a sensor
node physically, whereas a global adversary has a full view of the network as well as
sufficient resources and unlimited power. The adversary has malicious nodes that are
deployed to monitor the entire network and generate a high level of statistical analysis.
The capabilities of the adversary are further extended such that the adversary can
create a dataset of many observed intervals for each sensor node during the lifetime
of the network. The adversary uses this dataset to analyze the SLP. For example, a
neural network can be trained on this dataset in trying to expose the existence of the
real event. The adversary also has the ability to visualize the dataset by converting
it into a binary image, and extracting any suspicious patterns that could point to the
existence of the real event. Lastly, the adversary can employ a steganography method
to measure the binary relative entropy and uncertainty of the system.
4.1.4 The Anonymity Model
The anonymity of the proposed system can be broken into three main parts: (1)
existence of the real event, (2) location of the real event, and (3) time of the real
event. In order to satisfy all three parts, the existence of the real event must be
unknown to the adversaries. Then, location and time can be subsequently achieved.
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Figure 4.1. α is the false negative and β is the false positive.
The existence of the real event can be represented as follows:
f(event) =

1, a real event exists.
0, otherwise.
(4.4)
The anonymity of the system can be calculated by the following steganography
equation [89,90]:
d(α, β) = α log2
α
1− β + (1− α) log2
1− α
β
(4.5)
Where α is the probability of an adversary to falsely detect the real event. α is
the false negative of the system, which means the possibility of the adversary to say
there is an asset, and actually, there is no asset (Figure 4.1). In contrast, β is the
probability of the adversary not to detect the presence of the real event. β is the false
positive of the system, which means the possibility of the adversary to say there is
no asset, and actually, there is an asset (Figure 4.1). Therefore, in order to achieve
anonymity, the system should satisfy:
d(α, β) ≤ ε (4.6)
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Where d(α, β) is the binary relative entropy, and considered as the anonymity
provided by a specific technique, whereas ε is the anonymity required by the applica-
tion. The smaller ε is, the higher probability an adversary will fail to detect the real
event correctly.
4.1.5 The Anderson-Darling Test Model
The A-D test [91–96] is a statistical analysis algorithm. The A-D test is a good-
ness of fit test. It is used to determine if a series of data follows a specific distribution.
For example, if there is a sequence of samples that follows an exponential distribution,
the output of the A-D test should be either null or alternative hypotheses. Null (H0)
means the data follows an exponential distribution and alternative (H1) means the
data does not follow an exponential distribution.
Figure 4.2. The CDF of the exponential distribution.
In Figure 4.2, if the p-value that is represented as x falls in the red area under the
curve, this indicates H0 can be rejected, which means the data is not exponentially
distributed. On the other hand, if the p-value falls in the white area under the
curve, that indicates H0 cannot be rejected, which means the data is exponentially
distributed.
In Figure 4.3, random exponential data is examined by the A-D test for normal-
ity and exponentiality to illustrate the difference. The blue dots are the examined
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Figure 4.3. Normality and exponentiality test for samples that follow the exponential distribution.
samples and the red lines are the expected values. On the right side of Figure 4.3,
distributed samples follow the expected values indicating the samples are distributed
exponentially. On the left side of Figure 4.3, it shows that the distributed samples do
not follow the expected values indicating the samples are not normally distributed.
The A-D test works as follows: First, A2 is the mathematical notation of the
A-D test, and it can be calculated by the following equations:
A2 = −N − S (4.7)
S =
N∑
i=1
2i− 1
N
[lnF (Yi) + ln(1− F (YN+1−i)] (4.8)
Where N is the total number of samples, i is the sample ID, Yi is the samples
ordered in an ascending way, YN+1−i is the samples ordered in a descending way, F
is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF ) of the data. A2 is compared to the
corresponding critical value of the significance level α. The critical value of α = 0.05
is 1.321 in the exponentiality test, which means that the output of the A-D test
should be less than this number (threshold) for the data to pass the test. In case the
number of samples is small, the following equation is utilized to increase the accuracy
of the test.
A∗ = A2(1.0 +
0.6√
n
) (4.9)
47
The complexity of A-D test is O(n log n) since it uses Quicksort to order its
elements. The A-D test is employed by several algorithms to analyze the data in
order to determine the characteristics of the samples’ distribution.
4.2 Proposed Techniques for Source Anonymity against
Global Adversary
In this work, six techniques are developed to provide source anonymity and over-
come the statistical analysis of a global adversary. These techniques are Dummy Uni-
form Distribution (DUD), Dummy Adaptive Distribution (DAD), Controlled Dummy
Adaptive Distribution (CAD), Exponential Dummy Adaptive Distribution (EDAD),
Exponential Dummy Adaptive Distribution Plus One (EDADP1 ), and Exponential
Dummy Adaptive Distribution Plus Two (EDADP2 ). All proposed techniques are
based on injecting the network with dummy traffic to confuse the adversary about
the existence of the real event. Therefore, reducing the number of fake packets while
keeping a high level of source node anonymity is essential.
The notion of all techniques is to divide the lifetime of the network into intervals.
Hence, if an asset is detected by a node and a series of real packets needs to be trans-
mitted, instead of transmitting the real packet immediately after the occurrence of
an event, the packet will be transmitted at the end of the interval. This mechanism
is necessary to avoid the Time Correlation attack. All other nodes in the network
send fake packets at the end of the interval based on probability if they do not have
any real packets. When a sensor node receives a fake packet, the node will discard it
right away. However, if the packet is real, the node will add the packet to its buffer
and try to forward it in the upcoming interval based on probability. In case the real
packet is not transmitted in the upcoming interval, the real packet waits for one more
interval, and the node will attempt to forward it once again based on probability.
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This process means that each node in the network has its private pattern for sending
real packets, which look entirely random to the observer. Since real and fake packets
are sent only at the end of the interval, they should be both indistinguishable from
the adversary perspective.
4.2.1 Dummy Uniform Distribution (DUD)
Injecting a fake packet in every interval for each node during the lifetime of the
network is going to consume a significant amount of power and resources. The moti-
vation behind DUD is to have the same transmission rate for both real and dummy
traffic. DUD works as follows: Each node will throw a random number numrandom
between 0 and 1. If the random number is smaller than the predefined/constant
transmission rate, e.g., numrandom < rateconstant, send the real packet, but if there is
no real packet in the node’s buffer, it will send a fake packet instead. By applying
this mechanism, the adversary cannot recognize if the transmitted packet is real or
fake. When a node detects a real event, it uses the selected transmission rate, e.g.,
0.1, in trying to transmit the first real packet in the upcoming interval. For instance,
if a real event was detected between interval 5 and 6, the node will throw a random
number between 0 and 1. If this number is less than the selected threshold (trans-
mission rate), which is 0.1 in this case, the real packet will be transmitted in interval
6. However, if the random number is larger than the threshold, the real packet will
not be transmitted, and the node will try to send it in the following interval (interval
7). This process is repeated until all real packets are sent.
Fake packets are only generated if a node does not have a real event. In addition,
fake packets are also sent based on probability. If the random number is less than
the threshold and there are no real packets, a fake packet is generated and transmit-
ted instead. In contrast, if the random number was larger than the threshold, the
node will not transmit any packets. However, this scheme does not always guarantee
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the arrival of the real event’s packets because real packets can take a long time to
be delivered especially if there is a required maximum delay by the application. It
is obvious that increasing the transmission rate reduces the delay and increases the
overhead, or vice versa.
4.2.2 Dummy Adaptive Distribution (DAD)
To reduce the delay and increase the delivery ratio of received real packets to
the total number of real packets, the DAD technique is introduced and works as fol-
lows: All nodes in the network are categorized into fake nodes and real nodes. At
the beginning, all nodes will be considered as fake nodes using a predefined/constant
transmission rate as presented in DUD. Fake nodes do not generate fake packets in
every interval. They only generate and transmit fake packets if the thrown random
number between 0 and 1 is less than the selected threshold. However, if a node de-
tects a real event or forwards packets of a real event, then it becomes a real node.
A real node will increase the transmission rate of its real traffic by a specific value
(Equation (4.10)). Then, the real node decreases the transmission rate of its dummy
traffic by the same specific value (Equation (4.11)) after all real packets are transmit-
ted. This reduction in transmission rate occurs after the interval at which the last
real packet is transmitted. The increasing and decreasing percentages of the real and
fake transmission rates are based on the original transmission rate. Real and fake
transmission rates of the real nodes are given by the following equations:
Rreal = Rconst +
Nreal
Itotal
(4.10)
Rfake = Rconst − Nreal
Itotal
(4.11)
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Rconst =
Rreal +Rfake
2
(4.12)
Where Rreal and Rfake are the real and fake transmission rates. Rconst is the
predefined transmission rate of the network, Nreal is the number of real packets, and
Itotal is the number of total intervals.
Since the average of real traffic and dummy traffic is equal to the original constant
transmission rate (Equation (4.12)), the adversary will not notice any change in the
transmission rate of the network, which is essential to avoid Rate Monitoring attacks.
Additionally, in order to perform well, DAD needs to satisfy the following equation:
Nreal ≤ Rfake ∗ Itotal (4.13)
Otherwise, the number of fake packets will be smaller than the number of real
packets throughout the network. This situation allows the adversary to easily detect
the real event. DAD keeps the same level of anonymity and overhead as DUD, but it
Figure 4.4. An example of the DAD technique.
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increases the delivery ratio and reduces the average delay of the real event. However,
DAD is still unable to guarantee the maximum delay of real packets. An example of
DAD is shown in Figure 4.4. The transmission rate of green nodes is only modified
using Equations (4.10) and (4.11) when they have a real event to report. The black
nodes will keep their original transmission rate without any change because they only
generate fake packets.
4.2.3 Controlled Dummy Adaptive Distribution (CAD)
Since DUD and DAD schemes could fail in delivering packets of a real event
within a specific delay, CAD is introduced to maximize the delivery ratio and minimize
the delay to guarantee the arrival of all packets in the real event to the sink within the
required constraints. Based on DAD, CAD increases the real traffic transmission rate
and decreases the dummy traffic transmission rate using the same Equations (4.10),
(4.11) and (4.12). However, if a real node fails to transmit a real packet using the
real traffic transmission rate for n-intervals, this node will send the first real packet
in its buffer without using any probability (transmission rate is equal to one). Then,
the node reuses the original real traffic transmission rate for the following real packet.
By repeating this process, all real packets can be delivered within guaranteed n-
intervals as presented in Algorithm 4.1. This technique is a trade-off between delay
and anonymity. If n-intervals number is large, it means that there will be more delay
and a higher level of anonymity. If n-intervals number is small, that means less delay
and a lower level of anonymity. Therefore, adjusting the number of n-intervals is
based on the application requirements and the level of tolerance.
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Algorithm 4.1 CAD
1: constantRate← select the desired transmission rate
2: realRate← apply Equation (4.10)
3: fakeRate← apply Equation (4.11)
4: realIntervalCount← the current number of intervals a real packet waited
5: maxIntervalCount← the maximum number of intervals desired by the application
6: randomSending ← a random number between 0 and 1
7: for sloti < number of lifetime slots do
8: for each node in the network do
9: if node has a real packet in its buffer then
10: if sloti == sending interval then
11: if maxIntervalCount == realIntervalCount then
12: make realRate equal to 1
13: else
14: make the transmission rate equal to realRate
15: end if
16: if randomSending ≤ realRate then
17: remove the real packet from node’s buffer
18: adjuest the sending time for other packtes in buffer
19: add partition to time slot
20: run the routing protocol desired
21: send the real packet
22: else
23: delay all packets in buffer and try next interval
24: end if
25: else
26: if randomSending ≤ fakeRate then
27: send a fake packet
28: end if
29: end if
30: end if
31: end for
32: end for
4.2.4 Exponential Dummy Adaptive Distribution (EDAD)
To reduce the overhead of a WSN without sacrificing the anonymity of the source
node, EDAD is introduced. The exponential distribution has only one parameter
λ, which represents the transmission rate. Having one parameter helps to fix the
transmission rates flow of all nodes in the network. Therefore, the adversary is unable
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to distinguish the difference between real and fake events. However, each node still
has its own sending interval pattern that is based on probability. The next sending
interval for real and fake packets can be obtained from the following equation:
p = e−λt (4.14)
Where p is the probability, λ is the transmission rate, and t is the next sending
interval. In order to make the exponential distribution equation predict the next
sending interval, the equation needs to be rearranged. By taking the ln of both sides,
the equation will be as follows:
ln p = ln e−λt
ln p = −λt
t =
ln p
−λ (4.15)
Each node in the network implements Equation (4.15) to transmit both real and
fake packets. If there is no real event, nodes will keep sending fake packets. Once a
node detects a real event, it starts to transmit the real packets. The next scheduled
fake packet is replaced by the real one. This mechanism is necessary not to violate the
exponential distribution sequence. Otherwise, the real event can be easily detected
if an adversary applies Time Correlation attacks. Since all nodes use the same value
of λ, and each node has a different sending interval pattern, the adversary will be
confused about the existence of the real event.
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4.2.5 Exponential Dummy Adaptive Distribution Plus One
(EDADP1)
EDADP1 is based on the original EDAD. However, EDADP1 gives the priority
to real packets over the fake ones by increasing the transmission rate of real packets
within a certain percentage. This percentage cannot be extremely high; otherwise, the
real event will be easily detected by the adversary. Since the exponential distribution
is a statistical solution, the result should have multiple outcomes that satisfy the
analytical models. Therefore, the adversary should not be able to distinguish the
change of the transmission rate if the increase did not exceed a specific range, e.g.,
30%. For fake packets, EDADP1 uses the original transmission rate to reduce the
overhead. If a real packet is detected, EDADP1 increases the transmission rate
by a certain percentage to reduce the delay of the real event without sacrificing
the anonymity of the system. The decision of the appropriate threshold (maximum
transmission rate increase) relies on the original transmission rate and the number of
real packets. Algorithm 4.2 shows how EDADP1 works.
Algorithm 4.2 EDADP1
1: numberOfScenarios← number of the scenarios to generate
2: numberOfObservations← number of the samples in the sequance
3: numberOfRealPackets← number of real packets
4: rate← the original transmission rate
5: increasedRatePercentage← the increased transmission rate in percentage
6: select the desired numberOfObservations
7: for scenarioi < numberOfScenarios do
8: if there are real packets then
9: for realPacketi < numberOfRealPackets do
10: increase the transmission rate by increasedRatePercentage
11: end for
12: else
13: use the original transmission rate
14: end if
15: end for
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4.2.6 Exponential Dummy Adaptive Distribution Plus Two
(EDADP2)
EDADP2 is an alternative of EDADP1. EDADP2 increases the transmission
rate of only the odd real packets, and for the even real packets, EDADP2 uses the
same transmission rate as the fake packets. This variety provides better anonymity
for the system but in return, the delay will be higher for the real event. EDADP2
needs slightly more processing time since it filters which packets are odd and which
packets are even. This increase in processing time can be considered as a drawback
when compared to EDADP1. Algorithm 4.3 shows how EDADP2 works.
Algorithm 4.3 EDADP2
1: numberOfScenarios← number of the scenarios to generate
2: numberOfObservations← number of the samples in the sequance
3: numberOfRealPackets← number of real packets
4: rate← the original transmission rate
5: increasedRatePercentage← the increased transmission rate in percentage
6: select the desired numberOfObservations
7: for scenarioi < numberOfScenarios do
8: if there are real packets then
9: for realPacketi < numberOfRealPackets do
10: if realPacketi is odd then
11: increase the transmission rate by increasedRatePercentage
12: else
13: use the original transmission rate
14: end if
15: end for
16: else
17: use the original transmission rate
18: end if
19: end for
4.3 Metrics of the Proposed Techniques
The following four metrics affect the performance of the proposed techniques:
transmission rate, number of real packets, number of total intervals, and maximum
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delay a real packet can wait before transmission, which is only applicable to the CAD
technique. Using a higher transmission rate will increase the probability of delivering
all real packets within the application required delay. In addition, higher transmission
rates enhance the anonymity of the entire network and decrease the probability of an
adversary to detect the real event. However, higher transmission rates will cause more
dummy traffic leading to unnecessary overhead. The real event consists of several real
packets; the larger number of real packets, the more difficult it is to hide inside the
dummy traffic. Subsequently, more dummy traffic is required leading to a network
overhead.
The total number of intervals and the maximum delay required by an application
plays an imperative role in real packets delivery ratio. The total number of intervals
is calculated using the following equation:
Itotal =
ts
Ir
(4.16)
Where ts is the simulation time, and Ir is the interval rate. More intervals increase
the probability of real packets to arrive at the sink, which improves the overall per-
formance of the network. However, more intervals require more fake packets that will
consume resources and power. In CAD technique, the n-intervals number represents
how many intervals a node will wait before transmitting the real packet without us-
ing probability. More n-intervals mean higher anonymity and delay, whereas smaller
n-intervals mean less anonymity and delay.
Selecting the suitable values of these metrics will rely on the requirements of the
application. The trade-off between delay and overhead versus privacy must be taken
into consideration.
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4.4 The Proposed Specialized Event-Driven Network
Simulator for Security and Anonymity Applications
of Wireless Sensor Networks
This work presents a novel software architecture for a specialized network sim-
ulator that is targeted towards analysis and verification of anonymity algorithms for
WSNs. Even though many different network simulators exist and are popular such as
NS-2 , none of these can be adapted easily for testing of advanced WSN anonymity
algorithms. For example, in trying to implement anonymity, fake messages need to
be generated. A strong anonymity technique has to randomize the generation of fake
messages and improve the ratio of real to fake messages so that excessive power is
not being wasted by a sensor node. In order to analyze the effectiveness of different
anonymity algorithms, an event-driven network simulator is developed that provides
statistical and visualization features. This simulator can be easily configured to any
WSN topology and routing protocol. The software architecture of the simulator al-
lows for easy pluggability of different algorithms making it a valuable tool in WSN
security/anonymity deployment and research.
Developing a comprehensive WSN simulator is vital for most of the applications
so that engineers, developers, and researchers can examine their algorithms and net-
work policies to verify the functionality and efficiency before implementing them in
real applications. There are many WSN simulators available on the market such as
NS-2. Each one of them has its advantages and disadvantages [97]. Nevertheless,
one of the primary features lacking in prevailing WSN simulators is the support of
direct high-level real/fake packet injections, which is very crucial for anonymity ap-
plications. Such applications require the capability of injecting dummy traffic into
the network to mislead the adversary about the location and time of a real event.
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Since this feature is unavailable in a straightforward manner in current simulators,
a new simulator is introduced to overcome this problem by creating a suitable and
comfortable environment for developers who work in the security and anonymity field.
4.4.1 Background of Network Simulators
There is a variety of WSN simulators for the developers to choose from such as
NS-2, OPNET , and OMNeT++. In this section, a brief review regarding each one is
presented.
NS-2 stands for network simulator version 2. It is an object-oriented discrete
event-driven network simulator developed in C++ and OTcl programming languages.
NS-2 provides many models such as sensor channel and power models that are easy
to manipulate. NS-2 is used to simulate both wired and wireless networks. It has
some built-in protocols that are readily available such as LEACH and Directed Diffu-
sion [98]. However, if a developer desires to design a customized protocol or routing
technique, numerous modifications need to be made to NS-2 system files to incorpo-
rate the created C++ files with the OTcl setup. This process can be quite complicated
and not easy to achieve. Further, NS-2 lacks accommodating variations in specialized
built-in protocols for WSN, which can be inconvenient for developers [99]. Another
drawback is the complicated setup structure of NS-2 that increases the difficulty level
of debugging. Moreover, it contains bugs such as unreliability and simulation vali-
dation. NS-2 consumes a significant memory, and the speed of the simulator is very
slow, especially when simulating large networks [100].
OPNET is a WSN simulator that is based on an object-oriented design. OPNET
is popular and considered as a commercial modeling and simulation tool. It uses a
fast discrete event simulation engine that interacts with a parallel simulation kernel.
OPNET does not provide many built-in protocols, and even the built-in protocols
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are hard to adjust. Therefore, protocols and modules need to be developed from
scratch [101].
OMNet++ is an object-oriented paradigm network simulator, and it is also a dis-
crete simulation framework. OMNet++ can run on Windows, Linux, and Mac OS.
This simulation supports various structures for WSN such as the mobility framework,
MiXiM, Castalia, INET, and NesCT [102, 103]. OMNet++ is not a WSN simulator
itself. It needs to be bundled with other models to simulate WSNs, which can be
complicated [104].
4.4.2 The Proposed Network Simulator Architecture
When designing a reliable simulator, timing is crucial since it is the principal
character of any network simulator. A timing wheel concept is introduced, and it
works as follows: The timing wheel is employed to simulate the time, and it is broken
into many timing slots that are considered as the lifetime of the network. Each
time slot (interval) can denote a time duration such as 1 ns or 1 ms. Moreover,
each time slot consists of several partitions that represent concurrent activities, and
Figure 4.5. The proposed network simulator architecture.
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thus allow the simulator to manage several packets simultaneously. The architecture
of the network simulator contains many components, which collaborate with each
other providing an accurate and trusted outcome. The components are Packet, Node,
Network, Partition, Timing Wheel, Trace File, Traffic Generator, and Controller, as
shown in Figure 4.5. All of the components are developed using C#.
4.4.2.1 The Packet Component
A packet is a component that needs to be passed between nodes until it arrives
its destination. Each packet has a unique ID to distinguish itself from other packets
in the network during the simulation time. In addition, a packet must keep the source
node ID and the destination node ID to find its way throughout the network. Another
value that a packet has to retain is the starting transmitting interval, which allows
the simulator to calculate the packet delay. In some of the applications, a packet
type is necessary. In this kind of applications, some packets can be real, and other
can be fake to confuse the adversary about, e.g., the actual location of the event.
Therefore, adding the capability of having different types of packets is essential to
help the developer accommodate customized implementations. Lastly, the packet also
contains the actual data, known as the payload. An overview of the packet component
is shown in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6. The packet component.
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4.4.2.2 The Node Component
A node component is utilized to transmit, forward, or receive packets. For
instance, a source node transmits a sequence of packets to the sink node to notify
it about the current temperature. Each node should obtain a unique ID to have
clear communications between nodes. Some of the existing applications use location-
based routing, which requires the coordinates of nodes in order to select the shortest
path towards the destination. Therefore, a node should be capable of obtaining
and maintaining its current position, and this is accomplished in the deployment
stage. Node transmission range is another specialty included in the architecture,
which can be customized by the developers to fit their assumptions and requirements.
Furthermore, nodes have the capability to calculate the hop count between themselves
and the sink node as well as keeping a record of all neighboring nodes in the case
of using a different kind of routing protocol such as flooding. Additionally, a node
can keep track of all previous packets that were transmitted or forwarded during the
lifetime of the network. This feature is useful in the case where the developers want
to use a smart flooding (each node sends or forwards a packet only once even if the
packet is received multiple times by the same node) to avoid undesirable overhead.
All of these features in the node component provide the proposed architecture with
more flexibility and practicality. This allows developing new anonymity algorithms
Figure 4.7. The node component.
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in an easier way and straightforward manner. An overview of the node component is
shown in Figure 4.7.
4.4.2.3 The Network Component
The network component consists of nodes that are connecting to each other
creating a functional WSN. This component allows the developer to select source
and sink nodes of the event as well as the transmitting time. Commonly, the network
covers an area of interest such as a vast forest or a battlefield. Hence, the network has
two parameters to decide: dimensions of x-axis and y-axis. Each network has its own
lifetime based on the application requirements and topology failures. A scenario might
be deploying the nodes randomly in a particular area of interest or having specific
locations for each node in the network. All of these alternatives can be configured by
the developer based on the requirements of the application. The network component
requires each node in the network to provide a list of its neighboring nodes during
the deployment stage.
4.4.2.4 The Timing Wheel Component
The timing wheel is the primary component of the system since it manages
the simulation time and determines which nodes are transmitting and which nodes
are receiving. The timing wheel is divided into time slots based on the lifetime of
the simulation. Furthermore, each slot is broken into partitions (Figure 4.8). A slot
represents the sending, receiving, or forwarding time, and the partition represents the
sending, receiving, or forwarding node. Once the simulation commences, a method is
invoked that has a nested loop. The first loop iterates through the time slots, and the
second loop iterates through the partitions inside each slot. Moreover, the routing
protocol is a part of the timing wheel component. The routing protocol decides which
time slot will have which partition and action type (sending, receiving, or forwarding).
Algorithm 4.4 shows how the timing wheel component works. Some activities such as
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sending or forwarding will cause new activities like receiving. The new activity needs
to be added to the timing wheel, as shown in Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.8. The timing wheel component.
Algorithm 4.4 Timing Wheel
1: for sloti < number of lifetime slots do
2: for each node in the network do
3: if node has a packet in its buffer then
4: if sloti == sending interval then
5: - remove packet from node’s buffer
6: - adjuest the sending time for other packtes
7: in buffer
8: - add partition to time slot
9: - run the desired routing protocol
10: end if
11: end if
12: end for
13: end for
4.4.2.5 The Partition Component
Each time slot in the timing wheel may contain several partition components.
A partition points to a node object, which represents the sending or receiving node.
Additionally, a partition contains the type of the packet such as real or fake. It might
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further have an action such as sending, receiving or forwarding. Conclusively, the
most significant aspect of the partition component is its ability to possess a pointer
to the following partition that eventually generates a linked list of different events
inside every time slot in the timing wheel. This mechanism allows the network to
deal with multiple packets concurrently.
4.4.2.6 The Trace File Component
The trace file component is essential since it contains the results and statistics of
the simulation. Three files are generated: The first one has the number of packets sent
and dropped, packets type, which nodes are transmitting/forwarding and which are
not, the sender node, the destination node, event starting time, and event delay. All
information is combined into one file to make it easier for the developer to trace the
implementation (Figure 4.9). The second trace file has the statistics of all nodes such
as node ID, node coordinates, hop count to the sink, and the list of all neighboring
nodes (Figure 4.10). The last trace file includes the number of the cases in which
Figure 4.9. The network trace file (1).
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Figure 4.10. The network trace file (2).
Figure 4.11. The network trace file (3).
the event was successfully received, average delay, and average overhead for all cases
(Figure 4.11). Each case represents a complete scenario that has a different location
and starting time for the event.
4.4.2.7 The Traffic Generator Component
When simulating or testing a particular technique, a traffic generator is required.
This component is responsible for generating network traffic. The proposed architec-
ture can create random events including random events’ locations and times. The
generated traffic can also be controlled and specified for a particular location and
time. The adaptability of the architecture enables developers to have a variety of
selections to choose from. Algorithm 4.5 shows how the traffic generator component
works.
Algorithm 4.5 Traffic Generator
1: sendingNode← source node with event to send
2: receivingNode← sink node
3: startingInterval← event starting time
4: for each node in network do
5: if node id == sendingNode then
6: for i < number of packets required do
7: - create a packet
8: - add the packet to source node’s buffer
9: end for
10: end if
11: end for
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4.4.2.8 The Controller Component
This portion of the simulator architecture can be viewed as the brain of the
design since it brings all components together. This component decides which one
of the other architecture components should be created and which one should wait.
The controller focuses on producing different objects of the components, and how
they interact with each other to construct a scenario that satisfies the developer’s
demands. Additionally, this component is responsible for providing the interface that
will be controlled by the user to select the proper options for the desired simulation
scenario.
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CHAPTER 5: IMPLEMENTATION AND TEST
PLAN
5.1 Simulation Test Plan for DUD, DAD, CAD, and
EDAD
In the simulation, the WSN covers an area of interest: 600 m by 600 m. The
network consists of 25 sensor nodes and the lifetime of the simulation is 100 intervals.
These nodes monitor the movement of an asset such as a panda. The network only
has one sink on the right side of the network, as shown in Figure 5.1. If a node
detects a panda, it starts communicating with its neighbors to inform the sink about
the current location of the panda. All sensor nodes have a transmission range of 200
m. The network is tested at different transmission rates: 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3,
0.35, and 0.4. Then, if the random number between 0 and 1 is less than the selected
transmission rate, and a real event is received, a real packet will be sent; otherwise, a
fake packet will be sent instead. The number of packets in the real event is selected
Figure 5.1. Network topology. Blue nodes are conventional sensors. The red node is the sink.
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to be 3. If the random number exceeds the transmission rate, no packets will be sent.
For example, if the transmission rate is 0.05, ratereal and ratefake will be 0.08 and
0.02, respectively by using Equations (4.10) and (4.11) for DAD and CAD techniques.
Finally, the maximum number of intervals to wait before mandatory transmission in
CAD is selected to be 5 (the maximum wait before the node is forced to transmit the
real packet).
The panda can only be detected by one node in the network. One thousand
random cases are created for each transmission rate to evaluate the performance of
the WSN. Each case has a random position for the panda and a random starting
interval for the event between 0 and 49. A comparison between different transmission
rates and how they affect the average delay, delivery ratio, and overhead of the real
event is conducted. All of the proposed techniques were developed using C#.
5.2 Anonymity Test Plan for DUD, DAD, CAD, and
EDAD
There are many ways to validate that the proposed techniques are increasing
the delivery ratio and reducing the average delay as well as the overhead without
sacrificing the anonymity of the source node. In this work, three different approaches
are developed: visualize the output data of the simulation, feed the output data of
the simulation to a trained neural network, and apply Equation (4.5) for anonymity
testing as mentioned in the anonymity model described in Chapter 4. In the visu-
alization and neural network models, output data is converted into a binary matrix.
When a sensor node transmits a packet whether it is real or fake, the transmission
is represented by a binary value of 1, whereas if the node does not transmit, it is
represented by a binary value of 0. Since some of the intervals in the simulation will
have values of 1 and others will have values of 0, the output of the simulation can be
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represented as a binary matrix. Analytical models were developed using MATLAB.
5.2.1 The Visualization Model
In this approach, the output data, which is represented as a binary matrix, is
converted into a binary image. This conversion is made by representing ones as
black pixels and zeroes as white pixels to make the image visualization better at low
transmission rates. The main objective of this model is to check if there are any
visible patterns inside the image, such as a set of black pixels that look like a row or a
column, as shown in Figure 5.2b, which indicates the existence of a real event. A weak
technique refers to any technique that provides a binary image that is not entirely
random and can be very easily distinguishable from a completely random binary
image such as the one in Figure 5.2a. However, if there are no visible patterns and
the image looks completely random, the adversary will not be able to differentiate if
the real event exists. In the experiment, one thousand stochastic simulation scenarios
are created and converted into one image. Then, this image is compared to the binary
images generated by proposed techniques to check if there are any patterns. Different
transmission rates of 0.05, 0.1, and 0.15 are evaluated to examine the performance of
the proposed techniques.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.2. (a) The completely random binary image. (b) A weak technique binary image.
During the lifetime of a WSN, some nodes transmit packets, and some nodes do
not. In the case of transmitting, there are two possibilities for the packet type: real or
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fake. However, if there are no transmissions, there is only one possibility: no packet.
Therefore, real packets are represented as R, fake packets are represented as F, and no
transmissions are represented as 0. Figure 5.3a illustrates a sample of the simulation
output. For example, R in the first row of Figure 5.3a means that a real packet is
transmitted by node 6 in interval one. F in the second row of Figure 5.3a means
that a fake packet is transmitted by node 3 in interval two. This representation is
from the system perspective since the system can distinguish between real and fake
packets. However, the adversary is unable to differentiate between real and fake
packets. Therefore, any packet transmissions whether they are real or fake will be
represented as 1 and for no transmissions, they are represented as 0. Figure 5.3b
illustrates a sample of the simulation output from the adversary perspective.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.3. (a) Simulation output from the system perspective. (b) Simulation output from the
adversary perspective.
The adversary will combine the simulation output rows from Figure 5.3b into a
massive column, as shown in Figure 5.4a. This column has one location for the asset.
Since the adversary monitors the network over time, several columns are generated;
and each column has a different location for the asset to simulate the movement of it.
Figure 5.4b shows the output binary matrix when the adversary monitors the WSN
over time. This binary matrix will be converted into a binary image to extract any
suspicious patterns that might lead to the existence of the real event (Figure 5.2b).
The target of the proposed techniques is to provide completely random binary images
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such as the one in Figure 5.2a. As a result, the adversary will be confused about the
location of the asset as long as there are no visible traces in the produced images.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.4. (a) Simulation output rows combined into one column. (b) An adversary monitors the
WSN over time.
5.2.2 The Neural Network Model
Another way to show that the proposed solutions provide a high level of anonymity
is to create a neural network and train it on many different binary matrix patterns
produced by the proposed techniques. Then, feed the testing data to the trained neu-
ral network to see if it can detect the occurrence of an event. Each approach matrix
is compared with the random matrix to see if the neural network is able to recognize
the difference. In cases where the neural network can distinguish the difference, this
would mean that our solutions have a security flaw. Otherwise, the proposed tech-
niques provide a high level of anonymity.
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Two thousand cases are used as the training input for the neural network. One
thousand cases are random scenarios and the other one thousand cases represent one
of our solutions (DUD, DAD, CAD, and EDAD). The WSN has 25 sensor nodes and
100 intervals, by multiplying them, each case will have 2500 inputs. These cases are
fed to the neural network. W is the weights that are generated by the neural network.
At the beginning, these weights are selected randomly. Then, the weight values are
changed using a training back-propagation algorithm called Gradient Descent to train
the neural network. The aim of Gradient Descent is to find the best combination of
weights that minimizes errors between the neural network actual output and expected
output. b is a constant. A graphical representation of the neural network is shown in
Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5. Neural network configuration.
The transmission rates of 0.05, 0.1, and 0.15 are used to test each technique.
The hidden layer in the feed-forwarded neural network has 250 neurons. Sigmoid is
utilized as the activation function for both hidden and output layers. The output
layer has one neuron and produces 0, if there is no real event, or 1, otherwise. Two
neural network models have been created: one without validation data and the other
uses validation data to avoid overfitting the neural network.
5.2.3 The Steganography Model
In the steganography model, the adversary attempts to measure the uncertainty
of the system. The ideal case occurs when d(α, β) is equal to 0, which indicates that
the system is perfectly secure. Therefore, the proposed techniques should provide
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d(α, β) that is very close to 0 in order to confirm the high anonymity of our techniques.
Since the neural network in the previous subsection created some probabilities for
false negatives and false positives of the system, these probabilities can be utilized to
generate α and β, respectively.
5.3 Enhanced FitProbRate
The FitProbRate scheme [54] is developed to provide source anonymity. It uses
exponential distribution to predict the next time interval for fake packets. If a real
packet is detected, it uses the first interval that satisfies the A-D test. However, if
more than one real packet is detected, FitProbRate recovers the current mean (µ) of
the intervals to predict the next interval within:
(1− )µ ≤ µ ≤ (1 + ) (5.1)
Where  is the maximum increase or decrease percentage of the current µ. This
mechanism is essential to avoid a mean reduction for the current intervals sample,
which could lead the adversary to detect the presence of the real event. In addition,
the predicted interval must also satisfy the A-D test. This technique will be tested
under the proposed neural network model to show how it performs. Furthermore,
an enhanced version of FitProbRate is developed and compared to the original one
regarding the number of operations needed to decide whether a specific sequence
follows the exponential distribution or not. In the original technique, each node
performs the A-D test on the entire sequence of intervals, which increases the number
of operations rapidly since the complexity of A-D test is O(n log n). The A-D test
provides high accuracy when the number of intervals is 7 or more (n ≥ 7) [91–
96]. Therefore, instead of applying the A-D test on the entire sequence, it will only
be applied on the last ten intervals of the sequence, which reduces the number of
operations needed to test the exponentially of a selected sequence.
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5.4 EDADP1 vs. EDADP2 vs. FitProbRate
A comprehensive comparison between two of the proposed techniques EDADP1,
EDADP2, and the original FitProbRate is conducted. One thousand scenarios of each
technique are generated using the same criteria such as the exponential distribution
generator function to have a fair comparison. In addition, the average result of
the simulation output scenarios is calculated to have a more stable and accurate
comparison. The percentage increase in the transmission rate for real packets in
the proposed techniques is selected to be 30%. This increase is reasonable because
if the percentage increase was extremely high, the existence of the real event can
be easily exposed. However, this value should be evaluated based on the application
requirements and level of tolerance, which is considered as a trade-off between latency
and anonymity.
The x-axis of the comparison represents the different number of packets in the
real event, whereas the y-axis represents the tested metric. Therefore, every metric
in each technique is tested under a different number of real packets to evaluate the
technique’s performance. The comparison is divided into five different parts: average
delay, anonymity level, average processing time, A-D test, and polluted scenarios.
First, the proposed techniques are compared to FitProbRate regarding the average
delay. In the anonymity level, EDADP1, EDADP2, and FitProbRate are examined
by the proposed neural network model to show the difference between them in terms
of anonymity. Moreover, all techniques are tested regarding the average processing
time that can be further utilized to provide an indication of the overhead and power
consumption. Another metric is the A-D test, which shows how strict the generated
data sequence follows the exponential distribution. Lastly, polluted scenarios indicate
how reliable and stable the proposed techniques are when compared to FitProbRate.
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS
6.1 Performance Results of DUD, DAD, CAD, and
EDAD
In Figure 6.1a, CAD performs much better than DAD and EDAD regarding the
average delay especially at low transmission rates, which is desired by most of the
applications. DUD has the worst performance since it does not have any mechanism
to improve the delay of real packets. Regarding the delivery ratio, as shown in Fig-
ure 6.1b, CAD has the best performance. CAD has an advantage over the other three
techniques because it forces packets of a real event to be sent after a specific waiting
time, which is five-intervals in this experiment. DAD still performs better than DUD
since the real packets have a higher probability to be sent than the fake ones. Also,
EDAD has a higher performance than DUD because it uses exponential distribution.
Meanwhile, the overhead traffic in Figure 6.1c, is almost the same for DUD, DAD, and
CAD techniques because the total number of generated fake packets stays the same
for all three techniques. In other words, CAD and DAD reduce the average delay
and increase the delivery ratio without gaining additional overhead when compared
to DUD.
Figure 6.1c shows that EDAD reduces the overhead when compared to the other
techniques. It decreases the number of overhead packets whenever the transmission
rate increases. This reduction indicates that EDAD can be used at high transmis-
sion rates, which increases the delivery ratio and reduces the delay. However, the
performance of EDAD, in terms of average delay, is very similar to DAD and is not
as good as CAD because EDAD uses the exponential distribution without forcing
the real packets to be delivered within maximum delay. Therefore, EDAD does not
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guarantee the maximum delay of the real event. The CAD technique provides a high
delivery ratio at low and high transmission rates because it uses a specific mechanism
that forces the node to transmit its real packet after a predefined number of inter-
vals. However, this mechanism might lead to a privacy flaw because it violates the
uniform distribution sequence. EDAD has a similar performance to CAD regarding
the delivery ratio at high transmission rates. However, at low transmission rates, the
number of delivered packets is decreased in EDAD because of the delay caused by the
exponential distribution. In conclusion, EDAD reduces the overhead, but it increases
the delay while keeping a high level of anonymity. In contrast, CAD increases the
overhead and decreases the delay with an acceptable level of anonymity.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 6.1. (a) Average delay of real packets. (b) Delivery ratio of real packets. (c) Overhead of
real packets.
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6.2 Anonymity Analysis Results of DUD, DAD, CAD,
and EDAD
6.2.1 The Visualization Model
In Figures 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5, at all transmission rates, the proposed techniques
binary images look entirely random and are very similar to the random cases binary
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 6.2. The produced binary images with transmission rate of 0.15. (a) The completely
random image. (b) The DUD image. (c) The DAD image. (d) The CAD image.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 6.3. The produced binary images with transmission rate of 0.1. (a) The completely random
image. (b) The DUD image. (c) The DAD image. (d) The CAD image.
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image. The images depict transmission patterns for the DUD, DAD, CAD and EDAD
techniques do not indicate any visual patterns in the output images, which confirms
that the proposed techniques have a high level of anonymity.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 6.4. The produced binary images with transmission rate of 0.05. (a) The completely
random image. (b) The DUD image. (c) The DAD image. (d) The CAD image.
(a) (b)
Figure 6.5. The produced binary images with transmission rate of 0.15. (a) The completely
random image. (b) The EDAD image.
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6.2.2 The Neural Network Model
The first neural network model (without validation data) is shown in Figures 6.6,
6.7 and 6.8. The number of instances is the y-axis and errors are the x-axis. Errors are
the difference between targets that represent the expected outputs and outputs that
represent the actual outputs. The training data is represented by the blue columns
and testing data is represented by the red columns. The error of the training data
(blue columns) is almost 0 indicating that the neural network is trained properly,
whereas the error of testing data (red columns) is high and almost divided evenly
between 0 and 1 in the three techniques at all transmission rates. Moreover, Table 6.1
demonstrates that the uncertainty of the neural network for all techniques at different
transmission rates is around 50%, which is the ideal case. That means the neural
network is confused about the existence of the real event even after training the
network successfully. This confusion is an indication that the proposed techniques
are very reliable and guarantee a high level of source anonymity.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 6.6. DUD with transmission rate of (a) 0.05, (b) 0.1, and (c) 0.15.
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 6.7. DAD with transmission rate of (a) 0.05, (b) 0.1, and (c) 0.15.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 6.8. CAD with transmission rate of (a) 0.05, (b) 0.1, and (c) 0.15.
The second neural network model (with validation data) is shown in Figure 6.9.
The first row of sub-figures in Figure 6.9 shows that the number of instances is the y-
axis and errors are the x-axis. Errors are the difference between targets that represent
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Table 6.1. Percentage error of the testing data.
Rate DUD DAD CAD
0.05 50.4% 49.4% 56.5%
0.1 48.1% 48.6% 53.0%
0.15 52.3% 51.3% 53.4%
the expected outputs and outputs that represent the actual outputs. The training data
is represented by the blue columns, testing data is represented by the red columns,
and validation data is represented by the green columns. The neural network cannot
achieve 100% accuracy on the training data (blue columns) since the accuracy does
not improve on the validation data (green columns). The second row of sub-figures in
Figure 6.9 shows that after 11 or 12 epochs, based on the tested technique, the neural
network has an early stop to avoid overfitting, which reduces the generalization of the
neural network. The early stop occurs because the large amount of noise that was
introduced by the proposed techniques to disturb the neural network. The noise is
generated by injecting the WSN with dummy traffic that confuses the neural network
about the presence of the real event.
Figure 6.9. Error histogram and validation performance of DUD, DAD, CAD, and EDAD when
using validation data.
Figure 6.10 shows the test confusion matrices of all techniques. The green square in
the first row represents the true negative of the system, the green square in the second
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row represents the true positive of the system, the red square in the first row represents
the false negative of the system, the red square in the second row represents the false
positive of the system, and the blue square in the third row represents the accuracy
of the neural network. The ideal anonymity from the system perspective is when
the accuracy of the neural network is 50%, which indicates that the neural network is
totally uncertain about the existence of the real event. DUD achieved 49.3% accuracy,
DAD achieved 54.3% accuracy, CAD achieved 53.7% accuracy, and EDAD achieved
56.3% accuracy. These percentages are very close to 50% even after avoiding the
overfitting. Accordingly, the test confusion matrix is still unable to distinguish the
difference between real and fake events for all techniques, which validate the high
level of anonymity provided by the proposed techniques.
Figure 6.10. The test confusion matrix of DUD, DAD, CAD, and EDAD when using validation
data.
6.2.3 The Steganography Model
Table 6.2 shows that d(α, β) is very close to 0 in DUD, DAD, and CAD techniques
at different transmission rates, which satisfy a very small  that is required by most
of the applications to have a high level of anonymity. Moreover, EDAD is tested at
the transmission rate of 0.2, which produced d(α, β) of 0.001 and a neural network
accuracy of 49.4% (Figure 6.11). These numbers indicate the high level of anonymity
EDAD technique provides.
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Table 6.2. The d(α, β) output when uses different probabilities for α and β.
Rate DUD DAD CAD
β α d(α, β) β α d(α, β) β α d(α, β)
0.05 0.494 0.499 0.0001 0.504 0.508 0.0004 0.426 0.442 0.0507
0.1 0.516 0.521 0.0004 0.511 0.517 0.0023 0.468 0.472 0.0104
0.15 0.474 0.481 0.0058 0.486 0.491 0.0015 0.461 0.471 0.0134
Figure 6.11. The test confusion matrix of EDAD.
All analytical models show that the proposed techniques provide a high level of
anonymity and the global adversary cannot recognize the existence of the real event.
6.3 Enhanced FitProbRate
6.3.1 Neural Network Model vs. A-D Test Model
This section shows the reliability of the proposed neural network model when
compared to the A-D test model. The proposed model takes into consideration the
Rate Monitoring, Time Correlation, and the type of distribution when measuring the
anonymity of a system. However, the A-D test in FitProbRate only considers the
type of distribution as a measurement for anonymity. The original FitProbRate in
Figure 6.12a is tested by the proposed neural network model. Three categories are
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created: The real event has one real packet in the first category, two real packets
in the second category, and three real packets in the third category. Each category
consists of one thousand cases, further, each case has a different location and time
that are generated randomly for the real event. Results show that the proposed neural
network is confused about the existence of the real event when it has only one real
packet since one packet can be easily hidden within dummy traffic. However, when
the number of real packets increases, the proposed neural network model started
to detect more cases correctly. In the second category, when the number of real
packets is three, the proposed model detected around 66% of the cases correctly,
whereas in the third category when the number of real packets is five, the proposed
model detected more than 83% of the cases correctly. Therefore, the proposed model
performs much better when compared to the ordinary A-D test, which fails to identify
any of the cases accurately. The reason is that the A-D test only relies on testing the
sequence distribution to decide whether a technique provides high anonymity or not.
In contrast, the proposed model evaluates the anonymity based on many factors that
include Rate Monitoring, Time Correlation, and the type of distribution.
(a) (b)
Figure 6.12. (a) The original FitProbRate analyzed by the proposed neural network model. (b)
The validation performance of the proposed neural network model.
The third category that has five packets in the real event is explained in more
details: Figure 6.12b shows that the neural network stopped training after 41 epochs
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to avoid overfitting. The neural network stopped training since there are no further
improvements on the validation data. Figure 6.13a is the receiver operating charac-
teristic, and provides the relationship between the true positive rate and false positive
rate. The neural network has a higher performance when the blue line is stretched
to the top left corner. If the blue line is stretched to the bottom right corner, low
performance is achieved. In Figure 6.13a, training, validation, and testing data are
very close to the top left corner indicating the high performance of the proposed
model. Figure 6.13b demonstrates the confusion matrix of the training data, valida-
tion data, test data and all of the data combined. In the training confusion matrix,
the neural network achieved 90.3% accuracy, which is very reasonable because the
neural network cannot have 100% accuracy on the training data to avoid overfitting.
Validation data achieved 82.8% accuracy and testing data achieved 83.2% accuracy
for detection of the real event.
(a) (b)
Figure 6.13. (a) The receiver operating characteristic of the proposed neural network model. (b)
The confusion matrices of the proposed neural network model.
6.3.2 Enhanced FitPropRate vs. Original FitProbRate
A comparison regarding the number of operations between the enhanced and
original versions of FitPropRate is conducted to test the exponentiality of a sequence
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of intervals. Table 6.3 and Figure 6.14 show that when the number of intervals is equal
to ten, both techniques perform similarly. However, when the number of intervals
increases, the proposed technique performs much better than the original one since the
enhanced version only uses the previous ten intervals. In the case where the number of
intervals is one thousand, the original FitPropRate needs three thousand operations,
whereas the proposed technique only needs ten operations. Since the complexity
of A-D test is n log n, testing a smaller number of intervals reduces the number
of operations needed to know which type of distribution it is, such as exponential
distribution.
Table 6.3. Number of operations (O(n log n)) for one transmitting node.
Number of Intervals FitProbRate Proposed Technique
10 10 10
20 26 10
50 85 10
100 200 10
200 460 10
500 1349 10
1000 3000 10
Figure 6.14. Number of intervals vs. number of operations for one transmitting node.
In Table 6.4 and Figure 6.15, the number of transmitting nodes is selected to
be five instead of one as in the previous comparison. Results also show that the
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proposed technique reduces the number of operations needed whenever the number of
intervals increases when compared to the original FitPRobRate. In the case where the
number of intervals is one thousand, the original FitPropRate needs fifteen thousand
operations, whereas the proposed technique only needs fifty operations.
Table 6.4. Number of operations (O(n log n)) for five transmitting nodes.
Number of Intervals FitProbRate Proposed Technique
10 50 50
20 130 50
50 425 50
100 1000 50
200 2301 50
500 6747 50
1000 15000 50
Figure 6.15. Number of intervals vs. number of operations for five transmitting nodes.
6.4 EDADP1 vs. EDADP2 vs. FitProbRate
6.4.1 Average Delay
In Figure 6.16, the y-axis represents the delay per unit interval and the x-axis
represents the number of transmitted real packets. In Figure 6.16c, the average delay
of EDADP1 is similar to FitProbRate when the number of real packets increases in
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the case of 0.15 transmission rate. However, EDADP2 performance is the worst since
it does not increase the transmission rate of all real packets. EDADP2 only increases
the transmission rate of the odd real packets. Unlike EDADP1 that increases the
transmission rate of all real packets and FitProbRate that transmits the real packets as
soon as the entire sequence satisfies the A-D test. If the transmission rate is decreased
to 0.1, EDADP1 and FitProbRate perform similarly especially when the number of
real packets is four or more with a slight advantage to FitProbRate, as shown in
Figure 6.16b. This slightly less delay comes with a massive drawback regarding the
anonymity level, as shown in Figure 6.17. EDADP2 still provides higher delay when
compared to the other techniques. When the transmission rate is 0.05 (Figure 6.16a),
the performance of all three techniques dropped since the real packets are sent using
longer intervals. However, FitProbRate still has a slightly better performance over the
other two techniques due to the transmitting mechanism that is based on satisfying
the A-D test, but this mechanism sacrifices the anonymity.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 6.16. Average delay of real packets at (a) 0.05, (b) 0.1, and (c) 0.15 transmission rates.
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6.4.2 Anonymity Level
In Figure 6.17, the y-axis is the anonymity level and the x-axis is the number
of transmitted real packets. The ideal anonymity level is zero. EDADP2 has the
best performance at all transmission rates. EDADP2 provides a higher anonymity
level than EDADP1, especially when the number of real packets increases. The main
reason is the utilized mechanism by EDADP2 that increases the transmission rate of
the odd real packets and uses the original transmission rate for the even ones, which
confuses the neural network about the existence of the real event. EDADP1 provides
a high level of anonymity when the number of real packets is small and an acceptable
level of anonymity when the number of real packets is large. The EDADP1 has a
lower level of anonymity when compared to EDADP2 because EDADP1 increases
the transmission rate of all real packets. The performance of FitProbRate is poor
and far from the ideal anonymity level at all transmission rates because it only uses
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 6.17. Anonymity level using the proposed neural network model at (a) 0.05, (b) 0.1, and
(C) 0.15 transmission rates.
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the A-D test to measure the anonymity level of a system. In contrast, EDADP1 and
EDADP2 attempt to avoid Rate Monitoring attacks, Time Correlation attacks, and
the A-D test, which results in a much higher level of anonymity.
6.4.3 A-D Test
The A-D test is a useful metric that achieves a high level of anonymity. Never-
theless, it cannot be used as a stand-alone parameter. The A-D test should be merged
with other metrics such as Rate Monitoring and Time Correlation to have a sufficient
analysis of a system. In Figure 6.18, the y-axis represents the percentage of scenarios
that passed the A-D test, whereas the x-axis represents the number of transmitted
real packets. All techniques perform similarly in all transmission rates with a slightly
better performance for FitProbRate. The reason for this outcome is that FitProbRate
applies the A-D test on the entire sequence every time a real packet is detected.
However, this unnoticeable difference comes with massive processing time, overhead,
and power consumption, as shown in Figure 6.19.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 6.18. Anderson-Darling test at (a) 0.05, (b) 0.1, and (c) 0.15 transmission rates.
91
6.4.4 Average Processing Time
Figure 6.19 illustrates the efficiency of the proposed techniques in regards to the
average processing time, which can also indicate the overhead and power consumption
of the WSN. The y-axis represents the processing delay in seconds, whereas the x-
axis represents the number of transmitted real packets. EDADP1 and EDADP2 have
significantly less processing time when compared to FitProbRate at all transmission
rates. Additionally, the proposed techniques are not impacted by the number of real
packets. The average processing time needed by EDADP1 and EDADP2 is stable
regarding the number of real packets since the A-D test is not part of the proposed
techniques. In contrast, FitProbRate has a higher processing time, especially when the
number of real packets increases. This result was expected since FitProbRate applies
the A-D test every time a real packet is detected, which leads to more processing
delay, overhead, and power consumption.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 6.19. Average processing time at (a) 0.05, (b) 0.1, and (c) 0.15 transmission rates.
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Figure 6.20 shows that EDADP1 has a slight advantage over EDADP2 regarding
the average processing time because EDADP1 does not have to track the sequence
number of real packets. In other words, EDADP2 has more average processing time
because it needs to track the sequence number of each real packet to decide whether
the packet is odd or even.
Figure 6.20. Average processing time of EDADP1 and EDADP2 at 0.05 transmission rate.
6.4.5 Polluted Scenarios
The polluted scenarios show the reliability of the proposed techniques. In Fig-
ure 6.21, the y-axis represents the number of polluted scenarios out of one thou-
sand, whereas the x-axis is the number of transmitted real packets. The FitProbRate
technique is based on probability and the A-D test. Therefore, in some situations,
FitProbRate struggles to find the appropriate transmitting interval that satisfies the
A-D test. In this type of situations, FitProbRate enters an infinite loop in trying
to determine the time of the next interval, which causes the polluted scenario. In
FitProbRate, the number of polluted scenarios ranges from 15 to 33 cases based on
the selected transmission rate and the number of transmitted real packets. In the
proposed techniques, EDADP1 and EDADP2 achieved zero polluted scenarios be-
cause of their mechanism that does not allow any polluted scenarios to be created
since the A-D test is not part of the proposed techniques.
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This metric shows the high reliability of EDADP1 and EDADP2 when compared
to the FitProbRate scheme.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 6.21. Polluted scenarios at (a) 0.05, (b) 0.1, and (c) 0.15 transmission rates.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the experiments and simulation results of this work, the null (H0) hy-
pothesis cannot be rejected, which means that the adversary is confused about the
existence of the real event when the WSN is injected with dummy traffic. Given the
lack of techniques that provide high anonymity to the source node, this work presents
SLP techniques to improve the performance of WSNs while keeping a high level of
anonymity against a global adversary model that is capable of monitoring the entire
traffic in the network. Six different techniques, DUD, DAD, CAD, EDAD, EDADP1,
and EDADP2 were developed to provide a low transmission rate while still maintain-
ing anonymity. WSN applications that need privacy can select among the proposed
techniques based on the required level of anonymity with respect to delay, delivery
ratio, and overhead.
Previous literature does not provide validation models of the performance in
terms of anonymity. Therefore, all proposed techniques were tested under compre-
hensive analytical models (Visualization, Neural Network, and Steganography) to con-
firm that they provide a high level of anonymity. The simulations indicate that CAD
provides the best performance in terms of average delay and delivery ratio while guar-
anteeing the delivery of the event within a certain delay constraint. However, EDAD
outperforms other techniques with respect to overhead. The well-known FitProbRate
technique was tested under the proposed neural network model. The results demon-
strate that it performs poorly, especially when the number of real packets increases.
An enhanced version of FitProbRate was also developed and compared to the
original one. The results show that the proposed technique greatly reduces the num-
ber of operations required to determine if a specific sequence follows an exponential
distribution. Moreover, a comprehensive comparison between EDADP1, EDADP2,
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and FitProbRate was conducted that focuses on the average delay, anonymity level,
average processing time, Anderson-Darling test, and polluted scenarios. Results indi-
cate that EDADP1 and EDADP2 outperform the FitProbRate scheme overall. The
results confirm the high level of anonymity, efficient average processing time, and
reasonable average delay produced by the proposed techniques.
In the future work, other classifiers will be considered for the global adversary
model such as Deep Neural Networks and Support Vector Machine (SVM ). A more
sophisticated global adversary model that is capable of utilizing parallelism will also
be examined. In addition, an implementation of different routing protocols to show
the impact of these on the proposed techniques’ performance. Lastly, testing the
scalability of the proposed techniques by using larger networks will be attempted.
96
REFERENCES
[1] V. P. Illiano and E. C. Lupu, “Detecting malicious data injections in wireless
sensor networks: A survey,” ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), vol. 48, no. 2,
p. 24, 2015.
[2] A. Salleh, K. Mamat, and M. Y. Darus, “Integration of wireless sensor network
and web of things: Security perspective,” in the 8th IEEE Control and System
Graduate Research Colloquium (ICSGRC), 2017, pp. 138–143.
[3] W. Dargie and C. Poellabauer, Fundamentals of wireless sensor networks: the-
ory and practice. John Wiley & Sons, 2010.
[4] M. Conti, J. Willemsen, and B. Crispo, “Providing source location privacy in
wireless sensor networks: a survey,” IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutori-
als, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 1238–1280, 2013.
[5] Z. A. Eu, H.-P. Tan, and W. K. Seah, “Design and performance analysis of mac
schemes for wireless sensor networks powered by ambient energy harvesting,”
Ad Hoc Networks, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 300–323, 2011.
[6] D. K. Noh and J. Hur, “Using a dynamic backbone for efficient data delivery in
solar-powered wsns,” Journal of Network and Computer Applications, vol. 35,
no. 4, pp. 1277–1284, 2012.
[7] S. B. Lande and S. Z. Kawale, “Energy efficient routing protocol for wireless
sensor networks,” in the 8th International Conference on Computational Intel-
ligence and Communication Networks (CICN), Dec 2016, pp. 77–81.
97
[8] K. Pongaliur and L. Xiao, “Sensor node source privacy and packet recovery
under eavesdropping and node compromise attacks,” ACM Transactions on
Sensor Networks (TOSN), vol. 9, no. 4, p. 50, 2013.
[9] K. Hayawi, A. Mortezaei, and M. V. Tripunitara, “The limits of the trade-off
between query-anonymity and communication-cost in wireless sensor networks,”
in Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security
and Privacy, 2015, pp. 337–348.
[10] J. B. Hughes, P. Lazaridis, I. Glover, and A. Ball, “Opportunities for trans-
mission power control protocols in wireless sensor networks,” in the 23rd In-
ternational Conference on Automation and Computing (ICAC), Sept 2017, pp.
1–5.
[11] A. Tyagi, J. Kushwah, and M. Bhalla, “Threats to security of wireless sen-
sor networks,” in the 7th IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing,
Data Science & Engineering-Confluence, 2017, pp. 402–405.
[12] A. Mainwaring, D. Culler, J. Polastre, R. Szewczyk, and J. Anderson, “Wire-
less sensor networks for habitat monitoring,” in Proceedings of the 1st ACM
international workshop on Wireless sensor networks and applications, 2002, pp.
88–97.
[13] I. F. Akyildiz and M. C. Vuran, Wireless sensor networks. John Wiley & Sons,
2010, vol. 4.
[14] A. Praveena and S. Smys, “Efficient cryptographic approach for data security
in wireless sensor networks using mes vu,” in the 10th IEEE International Con-
ference on Intelligent Systems and Control (ISCO), 2016, pp. 1–6.
98
[15] P. Kamat, W. Xu, W. Trappe, and Y. Zhang, “Temporal privacy in wireless
sensor networks: Theory and practice,” ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks
(TOSN), vol. 5, no. 4, p. 28, 2009.
[16] J. Celestine, K. Vallepalli, T. Vinayaraj, J. Almotir, and A. Abuzneid, “An
energy efficient flooding protocol for enhanced security in wireless sensor net-
works,” in IEEE Systems, Applications and Technology Conference (LISAT),
Long Island, 2015, pp. 1–6.
[17] W. Tan, K. Xu, and D. Wang, “An anti-tracking source-location privacy pro-
tection protocol in wsns based on path extension,” IEEE internet of things
journal, vol. 1, no. 5, pp. 461–471, 2014.
[18] I. F. Akyildiz, W. Su, Y. Sankarasubramaniam, and E. Cayirci, “Wireless sensor
networks: a survey,” Computer networks, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 393–422, 2002.
[19] T. Arampatzis, J. Lygeros, and S. Manesis, “A survey of applications of wireless
sensors and wireless sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the IEEE International
Symposium on Intelligent Control and Automation, 2005, pp. 719–724.
[20] A. Milenkovic´, C. Otto, and E. Jovanov, “Wireless sensor networks for personal
health monitoring: Issues and an implementation,” Computer communications,
vol. 29, no. 13, pp. 2521–2533, 2006.
[21] J. Yick, B. Mukherjee, and D. Ghosal, “Wireless sensor network survey,” Com-
puter networks, vol. 52, no. 12, pp. 2292–2330, 2008.
[22] S. Pirbhulal, H. Zhang, W. Wu, and Y.-T. Zhang, “A comparative study of
fuzzy vault based security methods for wirless body sensor networks,” in the
10th IEEE International Conference on Sensing Technology (ICST), 2016, pp.
1–6.
99
[23] P. Belsis and G. Pantziou, “Protecting anonymity in wireless medical monitor-
ing environments,” in Proceedings of the 4th ACM International Conference on
PErvasive Technologies Related to Assistive Environments, 2011, p. 55.
[24] J. B. Hughes, P. Lazaridis, I. Glover, and A. Ball, “A survey of link qual-
ity properties related to transmission power control protocols in wireless sen-
sor networks,” in the 23rd IEEE International Conference on Automation and
Computing (ICAC), 2017, pp. 1–5.
[25] G.-A. L. Zodi, G. P. Hancke, G. P. Hancke, and A. B. Bagula, “Enhanced
centroid localization of wireless sensor nodes using linear and neighbor weight-
ing mechanisms,” in Proceedings of the 9th ACM International Conference on
Ubiquitous Information Management and Communication, 2015, p. 43.
[26] F. Alfayez, “A wireless sensor network system for border security and crossing
detection,” Ph.D. dissertation, Manchester Metropolitan University, 2015.
[27] T. Azzabi, H. Farhat, and N. Sahli, “A survey on wireless sensor networks
security issues and military specificities,” in IEEE International Conference on
Advanced Systems and Electric Technologies (IC ASET), 2017, pp. 66–72.
[28] P. Pancholi and A. S. Yadav, “Energy efficient density-based k clusters for wire-
less sensor networks,” in the 7th IEEE Power India International Conference
(PIICON), 2016, pp. 1–6.
[29] K. K. Gagneja, “Secure communication scheme for wireless sensor networks to
maintain anonymity,” in IEEE International Conference on Computing, Net-
working and Communications (ICNC), 2015, pp. 1142–1147.
[30] R. D. Shinganjude and D. P. Theng, “Inspecting the ways of source anonymity
in wireless sensor network,” in the 4th International Conference on Communi-
cation Systems and Network Technologies (CSNT), 2014, pp. 705–707.
100
[31] R. V. Steiner and E. Lupu, “Attestation in wireless sensor networks: A survey,”
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), vol. 49, no. 3, p. 51, 2016.
[32] M. Guerrero-Zapata, R. Zilan, J. M. Barcelo´-Ordinas, K. Bicakci, and B. Tavli,
“The future of security in wireless multimedia sensor networks,” Telecommuni-
cation Systems, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 77–91, 2010.
[33] Y. Wang, G. Attebury, and B. Ramamurthy, “A survey of security issues in
wireless sensor networks,” 2006.
[34] C. Gu, M. Bradbury, A. Jhumka, and M. Leeke, “Assessing the performance
of phantom routing on source location privacy in wireless sensor networks,” in
the 21st IEEE Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing
(PRDC), 2015, pp. 99–108.
[35] A. Gurjar and A. B. Patil, “Cluster based anonymization for source location
privacy in wireless sensor network,” in IEEE International Conference on Com-
munication Systems and Network Technologies (CSNT), 2013, pp. 248–251.
[36] A.-s. Abuzneid, T. Sobh, and M. Faezipour, “An enhanced communication pro-
tocol for anonymity and location privacy in wsn,” in IEEE Wireless Commu-
nications and Networking Conference Workshops (WCNCW), 2015, pp. 91–96.
[37] M. Bradbury, M. Leeke, and A. Jhumka, “A dynamic fake source algo-
rithm for source location privacy in wireless sensor networks,” in IEEE Trust-
com/BigDataSE/ISPA, vol. 1, 2015, pp. 531–538.
[38] L. Yao, L. Kang, P. Shang, and G. Wu, “Protecting the sink location privacy
in wireless sensor networks,” Personal and ubiquitous computing, vol. 17, no. 5,
pp. 883–893, 2013.
101
[39] I. J. Habeeb and R. A. Muhajjar, “Secured wireless sensor network using im-
proved key management,” in Proceedings of the 5th ACM International Con-
ference on Network, Communication and Computing, 2016, pp. 302–305.
[40] M. Chaudhari and S. Dharawath, “Toward a statistical framework for source
anonymity in sensor network using quantitative measures,” in IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Innovations in Information, Embedded and Communica-
tion Systems (ICIIECS), 2015, pp. 1–5.
[41] L. Eschenauer and V. D. Gligor, “A key-management scheme for distributed
sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, 2002, pp. 41–47.
[42] L. Zhou, C. Wan, J. Huang, B. Pei, and C. Chen, “The location privacy of
wireless sensor networks: Attacks and countermeasures,” in the 9th IEEE In-
ternational Conference on Broadband and Wireless Computing, Communication
and Applications (BWCCA), 2014, pp. 64–71.
[43] M. M. Mahmoud and X. Shen, “A cloud-based scheme for protecting source-
location privacy against hotspot-locating attack in wireless sensor networks,”
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 23, no. 10, pp.
1805–1818, 2012.
[44] S. S. Tabrizi and D. Ibrahim, “Security of the internet of things: An overview,”
in Proceedings of the ACM International Conference on Communication and
Information Systems, 2016, pp. 146–150.
[45] P. K. Roy, J. P. Singh, P. Kumar et al., “An efficient privacy preserving protocol
for source location privacy in wireless sensor networks,” in IEEE International
Conference on Wireless Communications, Signal Processing and Networking
(WiSPNET), 2016, pp. 1093–1097.
102
[46] R. Manjula and R. Datta, “An energy-efficient routing technique for privacy
preservation of assets monitored with wsn,” in IEEE Students’ Technology Sym-
posium (TechSym), 2014, pp. 325–330.
[47] M. Guo, X. Jin, N. Pissinou, S. Zanlongo, B. Carbunar, and S. S. Iyengar, “In-
network trajectory privacy preservation,” ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR),
vol. 48, no. 2, p. 23, 2015.
[48] I. Tomic´ and J. A. McCann, “A survey of potential security issues in existing
wireless sensor network protocols,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 2017.
[49] Z. Xiaoling, H. Donghui, H. Zhengfeng, and D. Liang, “A location privacy
preserving solution to resist passive and active attacks in vanet,” China Com-
munications, vol. 11, no. 9, pp. 60–67, 2014.
[50] T. Li, J. Ma, C. Sun, D. Wei, and N. Xi, “Pvad: Privacy-preserving verifi-
cation for secure routing in ad hoc networks,” in International Conference on
Networking and Network Applications (NaNA), Oct 2017, pp. 5–10.
[51] P. Spachos, D. Toumpakaris, and D. Hatzinakos, “Angle-based dynamic routing
scheme for source location privacy in wireless sensor networks,” in the 79th IEEE
Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC Spring), 2014, pp. 1–5.
[52] B. Alomair, A. Clark, J. Cuellar, and R. Poovendran, “Toward a statistical
framework for source anonymity in sensor networks,” IEEE Transactions on
Mobile Computing, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 248–260, 2013.
[53] A.-S. Abuzneid, T. Sobh, M. Faezipour, A. Mahmood, and J. James, “Fortified
anonymous communication protocol for location privacy in wsn: a modular
approach,” Sensors, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 5820–5864, 2015.
103
[54] M. Shao, Y. Yang, S. Zhu, and G. Cao, “Towards statistically strong source
anonymity for sensor networks,” in the 27th IEEE Conference on Computer
Communications (INFOCOM), 2008, pp. 51–55.
[55] W. Xiao, H. Zhang, Q. Wen, and W. Li, “Passive rfid-supported source location
privacy preservation against global eavesdroppers in wsn,” in the 5th IEEE
International Conference on Broadband Network & Multimedia Technology (IC-
BNMT), 2013, pp. 289–293.
[56] H. Wang, B. Sheng, and Q. Li, “Privacy-aware routing in sensor networks,”
Computer Networks, vol. 53, no. 9, pp. 1512–1529, 2009.
[57] R. Di Pietro and A. Viejo, “Location privacy and resilience in wireless sensor
networks querying,” Computer Communications, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 515–523,
2011.
[58] J.-H. Park, Y.-H. Jung, H. Ko, J.-J. Kim, and M.-S. Jun, “A privacy tech-
nique for providing anonymity to sensor nodes in a sensor network,” Ubiquitous
Computing and Multimedia Applications, pp. 327–335, 2011.
[59] Y. Fan, J. Chen, X. Lin, and X. Shen, “Preventing traffic explosion and achiev-
ing source unobservability in multi-hop wireless networks using network cod-
ing,” in IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference (GLOBECOM 2010),
2010, pp. 1–5.
[60] Y. Fan, Y. Jiang, H. Zhu, and X. Shen, “An efficient privacy-preserving scheme
against traffic analysis attacks in network coding,” in IEEE INFOCOM, 2009,
pp. 2213–2221.
[61] J. F. Laikin, M. Bradbury, C. Gu, and M. Leeke, “Towards fake sources for
source location privacy in wireless sensor networks with multiple sources,” in
104
IEEE International Conference on Communication Systems (ICCS), 2016, pp.
1–6.
[62] A. Jhumka, M. Leeke, and S. Shrestha, “On the use of fake sources for source
location privacy: Trade-offs between energy and privacy,” The Computer Jour-
nal, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 860–874, 2011.
[63] X. Zha, K. Zheng, and D. Zhang, “Anti-pollution source location privacy pre-
serving scheme in wireless sensor networks,” in the 13th Annual IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Sensing, Communication, and Networking (SECON),
2016, pp. 1–8.
[64] Y. Pant and H. Bhadauria, “Performance study of routing protocols in wireless
sensor network,” in the 8th IEEE International Conference on Computational
Intelligence and Communication Networks (CICN), 2016, pp. 134–138.
[65] A. Proan˜o and L. Lazos, “Perfect contextual information privacy in wsns under-
colluding eavesdroppers,” in Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Security
and privacy in wireless and mobile networks, 2013, pp. 89–94.
[66] K. Mehta, D. Liu, and M. Wright, “Location privacy in sensor networks against
a global eavesdropper,” in IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
(ICNP), 2007, pp. 314–323.
[67] Y. Yang, M. Shao, S. Zhu, B. Urgaonkar, and G. Cao, “Towards event source
unobservability with minimum network traffic in sensor networks,” in Proceed-
ings of the 1st ACM conference on Wireless network security, 2008, pp. 77–88.
[68] X. Niu, C. Wei, W. Feng, and Q. Chen, “Osap: Optimal-cluster-based source
anonymity protocol in delay-sensitive wireless sensor networks,” in IEEE Wire-
less Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC), 2014, pp. 2880–
2885.
105
[69] C. M. George and M. Kumar, “Cluster based location privacy in wireless sensor
networks against a universal adversary,” in IEEE International Conference on
Information Communication and Embedded Systems (ICICES), 2013, pp. 288–
293.
[70] Y. Ouyang, Z. Le, D. Liu, J. Ford, and F. Makedon, “Source location privacy
against laptop-class attacks in sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the 4th ACM
international conference on Security and privacy in communication netowrks,
2008, p. 5.
[71] A. Abbasi, A. Khonsari, and M. S. Talebi, “Source location anonymity for
sensor networks,” in the 6th IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking
Conference (CCNC), 2009, pp. 1–5.
[72] K. Bicakci, H. Gultekin, B. Tavli, and I. E. Bagci, “Maximizing lifetime of
event-unobservable wireless sensor networks,” Computer Standards & Inter-
faces, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 401–410, 2011.
[73] W. Yang and W. Zhu, “Protecting source location privacy in wireless sensor
networks with data aggregation,” Ubiquitous Intelligence and Computing, pp.
252–266, 2010.
[74] Y. Yang, J. Zhou, R. H. Deng, and F. Bao, “Better security enforcement in
trusted computing enabled heterogeneous wireless sensor networks,” Security
and Communication Networks, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 11–22, 2011.
[75] R. Lu, X. Lin, H. Zhu, and X. Shen, “Tesp2: Timed efficient source privacy
preservation scheme for wireless sensor networks,” in IEEE International Con-
ference on Communications (ICC), 2010, pp. 1–6.
106
[76] J.-P. Sheu, J.-R. Jiang, and C. Tu, “Anonymous path routing in wireless sensor
networks,” in IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), 2008,
pp. 2728–2734.
[77] J.-R. Jiang, J.-P. Sheu, C. Tu, J.-W. Wu et al., “An anonymous path routing
(apr) protocol for wireless sensor networks.” J. Inf. Sci. Eng., vol. 27, no. 2,
pp. 657–680, 2011.
[78] G. Suarez-Tangil, E. Palomar, B. Ramos, and A. Ribagorda, “An experimen-
tal comparison of source location privacy methods for power optimization in
wsns,” in Proceedings of the 3rd WSEAS international conference on Advances
in sensors, signals and materials, 2010, pp. 79–84.
[79] S. Kokalj-Filipovic´, F. Le Fessant, and P. Spasojevic´, “The quality of source lo-
cation protection in globally attacked sensor networks,” in IEEE International
Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops (PER-
COM Workshops), 2011, pp. 44–49.
[80] K. Mehta, D. Liu, and M. Wright, “Protecting location privacy in sensor net-
works against a global eavesdropper,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing,
vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 320–336, 2012.
[81] R. Doomun, T. Hayajneh, P. Krishnamurthy, and D. Tipper, “Secloud: Source
and destination seclusion using clouds for wireless ad hoc networks,” in IEEE
Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC), 2009, pp. 361–367.
[82] S. Ortolani, M. Conti, B. Crispo, and R. Di Pietro, “Events privacy in wsns: A
new model and its application,” in IEEE International Symposium on a World
of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM), 2011, pp. 1–9.
107
[83] J. Deng, R. Han, and S. Mishra, “Decorrelating wireless sensor network traffic
to inhibit traffic analysis attacks,” Pervasive and Mobile Computing, vol. 2,
no. 2, pp. 159–186, 2006.
[84] D. Huang, “Traffic analysis-based unlinkability measure for ieee 802.11 b-based
communication systems,” in Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Wireless
security, 2006, pp. 65–74.
[85] E. Erdemir and T. E. Tuncer, “Path planning and localization for mobile anchor
based wireless sensor networks,” in the 25th IEEE European Signal Processing
Conference (EUSIPCO), 2017, pp. 131–135.
[86] Y. Xiong, N. Wu, and H. Wang, “On the performance limits of cooperative
localization in wireless sensor networks with strong sensor position uncertainty,”
IEEE Communications Letters, 2017.
[87] J. M. Pak, C. K. Ahn, Y. S. Shmaliy, and M. T. Lim, “Improving reliability
of particle filter-based localization in wireless sensor networks via hybrid par-
ticle/fir filtering,” IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, vol. 11, no. 5,
pp. 1089–1098, 2015.
[88] R. Choudhary, A. Deepak, and S. Kumar, “A study of energy efficient transmis-
sion protocol in wirless sensor network,” in the 13th IEEE International Con-
ference on Wireless and Optical Communications Networks (WOCN), 2016, pp.
1–4.
[89] S. Katzenbeisser and F. Petitcolas, Information hiding techniques for steganog-
raphy and digital watermarking. Artech house, 2000.
[90] J. Fridrich, Steganography in digital media: principles, algorithms, and applica-
tions. Cambridge University Press, 2009.
108
[91] M. A. Stephens, “Edf statistics for goodness of fit and some comparisons,”
Journal of the American statistical Association, vol. 69, no. 347, pp. 730–737,
1974.
[92] M. A. Stephens, “Asymptotic results for goodness-of-fit statistics with unknown
parameters,” The Annals of Statistics, pp. 357–369, 1976.
[93] M. A. Stephens, “Goodness of fit for the extreme value distribution,”
Biometrika, vol. 64, no. 3, pp. 583–588, 1977.
[94] M. A. Stephens, “Goodness of fit tests with special reference to tests for ex-
ponentiality,” Stanford University, Department of Statistics, CA, Tech. Rep.,
1978.
[95] M. A. Stephens, “Tests of fit for the logistic distribution based on the empirical
distribution function,” Biometrika, vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 591–595, 1979.
[96] F. J. O’Reilly and M. A. Stephens, “Characterizations and goodness of fit tests,”
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological), pp. 353–360,
1982.
[97] B. Musznicki and P. Zwierzykowski, “Survey of simulators for wireless sensor
networks,” International Journal of Grid and Distributed Computing, vol. 5,
no. 3, pp. 23–50, 2012.
[98] K. Fall and K. Varadhan, “The ns manual (formerly ns notes and documenta-
tion),” The VINT project, vol. 47, 2005.
[99] Q. I. Ali, “Simulation framework of wireless sensor network (wsn) using mat-
lab/simulink software,” Edited by Vasilios N. Katsikis, vol. 263, 2012.
109
[100] X. Xian, W. Shi, and H. Huang, “Comparison of omnet++ and other simulator
for wsn simulation,” in the 3rd IEEE Conference on Industrial Electronics and
Applications, June 2008, pp. 1439–1443.
[101] G. F. Lucio, M. Paredes-Farrera, E. Jammeh, M. Fleury, and M. J. Reed,
“Opnet modeler and ns-2: Comparing the accuracy of network simulators for
packet-level analysis using a network testbed,” WSEAS Transactions on Com-
puters, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 700–707, 2003.
[102] A. Varga et al., “The omnet++ discrete event simulation system,” in Proceed-
ings of the European simulation multiconference (ESM2001), vol. 9, no. S 185.
sn, 2001, p. 65.
[103] A. Varga and R. Hornig, “An overview of the omnet++ simulation environ-
ment,” in Proceedings of the 1st ICST international conference on Simulation
tools and techniques for communications, networks and systems & workshops,
2008, p. 60.
[104] A. Nayyar and R. Singh, “A comprehensive review of simulation tools for wire-
less sensor networks (wsns),” Journal of Wireless Networking and Communica-
tions, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 19–47, 2015.
110
